other versions
- jessie 0.2.5.16-1
- jessie-backports 0.2.9.16-1~bpo8+1
- stretch 0.2.9.16-1
- testing 0.3.5.7-1
- stretch-backports 0.3.5.7-1~bpo9+1
- unstable 0.3.5.8-1
- experimental 0.4.0.1-alpha-1
TOR(1) | Tor Manual | TOR(1) |
NAME¶
tor - The second-generation onion routerSYNOPSIS¶
tor [OPTION value]...DESCRIPTION¶
Tor is a connection-oriented anonymizing communication service. Users choose a source-routed path through a set of nodes, and negotiate a "virtual circuit" through the network, in which each node knows its predecessor and successor, but no others. Traffic flowing down the circuit is unwrapped by a symmetric key at each node, which reveals the downstream node. Basically, Tor provides a distributed network of servers or relays ("onion routers"). Users bounce their TCP streams — web traffic, ftp, ssh, etc. — around the network, and recipients, observers, and even the relays themselves have difficulty tracking the source of the stream. By default, tor will only act as a client only. To help the network by providing bandwidth as a relay, change the ORPort configuration option — see below. Please also consult the documentation on the Tor Project’s website.COMMAND-LINE OPTIONS¶
-h, -helpDisplay a short help message and exit.
-f FILE
Specify a new configuration file to contain further Tor
configuration options. (Default: /etc/tor/torrc, or $HOME/.torrc if that file
is not found)
--allow-missing-torrc
Do not require that configuration file specified by
-f exist if default torrc can be accessed.
--defaults-torrc FILE
Specify a file in which to find default values for Tor
options. The contents of this file are overridden by those in the regular
configuration file, and by those on the command line. (Default:
/etc/tor/torrc-defaults.)
--ignore-missing-torrc
Specifies that Tor should treat a missing torrc file as
though it were empty. Ordinarily, Tor does this for missing default torrc
files, but not for those specified on the command line.
--hash-password PASSWORD
Generates a hashed password for control port
access.
--list-fingerprint
Generate your keys and output your nickname and
fingerprint.
--verify-config
Verify the configuration file is valid.
--service install [--options command-line options]
Install an instance of Tor as a Windows service, with the
provided command-line options. Current instructions can be found at
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorFAQ#HowdoIrunmyTorrelayasanNTservice
--service remove|start|stop
Remove, start, or stop a configured Tor Windows
service.
--nt-service
Used internally to implement a Windows service.
--list-torrc-options
List all valid options.
--version
Display Tor version and exit.
--quiet|--hush
Override the default console log. By default, Tor starts
out logging messages at level "notice" and higher to the console. It
stops doing so after it parses its configuration, if the configuration tells
it to log anywhere else. You can override this behavior with the --hush
option, which tells Tor to only send warnings and errors to the console, or
with the --quiet option, which tells Tor not to log to the console at
all.
Other options can be specified on the command-line in the format "--option
value", in the format "option value", or in a configuration
file. For instance, you can tell Tor to start listening for SOCKS connections
on port 9999 by passing --SOCKSPort 9999 or SOCKSPort 9999 to it on the
command line, or by putting "SOCKSPort 9999" in the configuration
file. You will need to quote options with spaces in them: if you want Tor to
log all debugging messages to debug.log, you will probably need to say --Log
debug file debug.log.
Options on the command line override those in configuration files. See the next
section for more information.
THE CONFIGURATION FILE FORMAT¶
All configuration options in a configuration are written on a single line by default. They take the form of an option name and a value, or an option name and a quoted value (option value or option "value"). Anything after a # character is treated as a comment. Options are case-insensitive. C-style escaped characters are allowed inside quoted values. To split one configuration entry into multiple lines, use a single backslash character (\) before the end of the line. Comments can be used in such multiline entries, but they must start at the beginning of a line. By default, an option on the command line overrides an option found in the configuration file, and an option in a configuration file overrides one in the defaults file. This rule is simple for options that take a single value, but it can become complicated for options that are allowed to occur more than once: if you specify four SOCKSPorts in your configuration file, and one more SOCKSPort on the command line, the option on the command line will replace all of the SOCKSPorts in the configuration file. If this isn’t what you want, prefix the option name with a plus sign, and it will be appended to the previous set of options instead. Alternatively, you might want to remove every instance of an option in the configuration file, and not replace it at all: you might want to say on the command line that you want no SOCKSPorts at all. To do that, prefix the option name with a forward slash.GENERAL OPTIONS¶
BandwidthRate N bytes|KBytes|MBytes|GBytes| KBits|MBits| GBitsA token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth
usage on this node to the specified number of bytes per second, and the
average outgoing bandwidth usage to that same value. If you want to run a
relay in the public network, this needs to be at the very least 30
KBytes (that is, 30720 bytes). (Default: 1 GByte)
With this option, and in other options that take arguments in bytes, KBytes, and
so on, other formats are also supported. Notably, "KBytes" can also
be written as "kilobytes" or "kb"; "MBytes" can
be written as "megabytes" or "MB"; "kbits" can
be written as "kilobits"; and so forth. Tor also accepts
"byte" and "bit" in the singular. The prefixes
"tera" and "T" are also recognized. If no units are given,
we default to bytes. To avoid confusion, we recommend writing
"bytes" or "bits" explicitly, since it’s easy to
forget that "B" means bytes, not bits.
BandwidthBurst N
bytes|KBytes|MBytes|GBytes|
KBits|MBits| GBits
Limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the
burst) to the given number of bytes in each direction. (Default: 1
GByte)
MaxAdvertisedBandwidth N
bytes|KBytes|MBytes|GBytes|KBits|MBits|GBits
If set, we will not advertise more than this amount of
bandwidth for our BandwidthRate. Server operators who want to reduce the
number of clients who ask to build circuits through them (since this is
proportional to advertised bandwidth rate) can thus reduce the CPU demands on
their server without impacting network performance.
RelayBandwidthRate N
bytes|KBytes|MBytes|GBytes|
KBits|MBits| GBits
If not 0, a separate token bucket limits the average
incoming bandwidth usage for _relayed traffic_ on this node to the specified
number of bytes per second, and the average outgoing bandwidth usage to that
same value. Relayed traffic currently is calculated to include answers to
directory requests, but that may change in future versions. (Default: 0)
RelayBandwidthBurst N
bytes|KBytes|MBytes|GBytes|
KBits|MBits| GBits
If not 0, limit the maximum token bucket size (also known
as the burst) for _relayed traffic_ to the given number of bytes in each
direction. (Default: 0)
PerConnBWRate N
bytes|KBytes|MBytes|GBytes|
KBits|MBits| GBits
If set, do separate rate limiting for each connection
from a non-relay. You should never need to change this value, since a
network-wide value is published in the consensus and your relay will use that
value. (Default: 0)
PerConnBWBurst N
bytes|KBytes|MBytes|GBytes|
KBits|MBits| GBits
If set, do separate rate limiting for each connection
from a non-relay. You should never need to change this value, since a
network-wide value is published in the consensus and your relay will use that
value. (Default: 0)
ClientTransportPlugin transport socks4|socks5
IP:PORT, ClientTransportPlugin transport exec
path-to-binary [options]
In its first form, when set along with a corresponding
Bridge line, the Tor client forwards its traffic to a SOCKS-speaking proxy on
"IP:PORT". It’s the duty of that proxy to properly forward
the traffic to the bridge.
In its second form, when set along with a corresponding Bridge line, the Tor
client launches the pluggable transport proxy executable in
path-to-binary using options as its command-line options, and
forwards its traffic to it. It’s the duty of that proxy to properly
forward the traffic to the bridge.
ServerTransportPlugin transport exec path-to-binary
[options]
The Tor relay launches the pluggable transport proxy in
path-to-binary using options as its command-line options, and
expects to receive proxied client traffic from it.
ServerTransportListenAddr transport IP:PORT
When this option is set, Tor will suggest
IP:PORT as the listening address of any pluggable transport
proxy that tries to launch transport.
ServerTransportOptions transport k=v k=v ...
When this option is set, Tor will pass the k=v
parameters to any pluggable transport proxy that tries to launch
transport.
(Example: ServerTransportOptions obfs45 shared-secret=bridgepasswd
cache=/var/lib/tor/cache)
ExtORPort [address:]port|auto Open this port to
listen for Extended ORPort connections from your pluggable transports.
ExtORPortCookieAuthFile Path
If set, this option overrides the default location and
file name for the Extended ORPort’s cookie file — the cookie
file is needed for pluggable transports to communicate through the Extended
ORPort.
ExtORPortCookieAuthFileGroupReadable 0|1
If this option is set to 0, don’t allow the
filesystem group to read the Extended OR Port cookie file. If the option is
set to 1, make the cookie file readable by the default GID. [Making the file
readable by other groups is not yet implemented; let us know if you need this
for some reason.] (Default: 0)
ConnLimit NUM
The minimum number of file descriptors that must be
available to the Tor process before it will start. Tor will ask the OS for as
many file descriptors as the OS will allow (you can find this by "ulimit
-H -n"). If this number is less than ConnLimit, then Tor will refuse to
start.
You probably don’t need to adjust this. It has no effect on Windows since
that platform lacks getrlimit(). (Default: 1000)
DisableNetwork 0|1
When this option is set, we don’t listen for or
accept any connections other than controller connections, and we close (and
don’t reattempt) any outbound connections. Controllers sometimes use
this option to avoid using the network until Tor is fully configured.
(Default: 0)
ConstrainedSockets 0|1
If set, Tor will tell the kernel to attempt to shrink the
buffers for all sockets to the size specified in ConstrainedSockSize.
This is useful for virtual servers and other environments where system level
TCP buffers may be limited. If you’re on a virtual server, and you
encounter the "Error creating network socket: No buffer space
available" message, you are likely experiencing this problem.
The preferred solution is to have the admin increase the buffer pool for the
host itself via /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_mem or equivalent facility; this
configuration option is a second-resort.
The DirPort option should also not be used if TCP buffers are scarce. The cached
directory requests consume additional sockets which exacerbates the problem.
You should not enable this feature unless you encounter the "no
buffer space available" issue. Reducing the TCP buffers affects window
size for the TCP stream and will reduce throughput in proportion to round trip
time on long paths. (Default: 0)
ConstrainedSockSize N bytes|KBytes
When ConstrainedSockets is enabled the receive and
transmit buffers for all sockets will be set to this limit. Must be a value
between 2048 and 262144, in 1024 byte increments. Default of 8192 is
recommended.
ControlPort PORT|auto
If set, Tor will accept connections on this port and
allow those connections to control the Tor process using the Tor Control
Protocol (described in control-spec.txt). Note: unless you also specify one or
more of HashedControlPassword or CookieAuthentication, setting
this option will cause Tor to allow any process on the local host to control
it. (Setting both authentication methods means either method is sufficient to
authenticate to Tor.) This option is required for many Tor controllers; most
use the value of 9051. Set it to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for
you. (Default: 0)
ControlListenAddress IP[:PORT]
Bind the controller listener to this address. If you
specify a port, bind to this port rather than the one specified in
ControlPort. We strongly recommend that you leave this alone unless you know
what you’re doing, since giving attackers access to your control
listener is really dangerous. This directive can be specified multiple times
to bind to multiple addresses/ports. (Default: 127.0.0.1)
ControlSocket Path
Like ControlPort, but listens on a Unix domain socket,
rather than a TCP socket. (Unix and Unix-like systems only.)
ControlSocketsGroupWritable 0|1
If this option is set to 0, don’t allow the
filesystem group to read and write unix sockets (e.g. ControlSocket). If the
option is set to 1, make the control socket readable and writable by the
default GID. (Default: 0)
HashedControlPassword hashed_password
Allow connections on the control port if they present the
password whose one-way hash is hashed_password. You can compute the
hash of a password by running "tor --hash-password password".
You can provide several acceptable passwords by using more than one
HashedControlPassword line.
CookieAuthentication 0|1
If this option is set to 1, allow connections on the
control port when the connecting process knows the contents of a file named
"control_auth_cookie", which Tor will create in its data directory.
This authentication method should only be used on systems with good filesystem
security. (Default: 0)
CookieAuthFile Path
If set, this option overrides the default location and
file name for Tor’s cookie file. (See CookieAuthentication
above.)
CookieAuthFileGroupReadable 0|1
If this option is set to 0, don’t allow the
filesystem group to read the cookie file. If the option is set to 1, make the
cookie file readable by the default GID. [Making the file readable by other
groups is not yet implemented; let us know if you need this for some reason.]
(Default: 0)
ControlPortWriteToFile Path
If set, Tor writes the address and port of any control
port it opens to this address. Usable by controllers to learn the actual
control port when ControlPort is set to "auto".
ControlPortFileGroupReadable 0|1
If this option is set to 0, don’t allow the
filesystem group to read the control port file. If the option is set to 1,
make the control port file readable by the default GID. (Default: 0)
DataDirectory DIR
Store working data in DIR (Default: /var/lib/tor)
FallbackDir address:port orport=port
id=fingerprint [weight= num]
When we’re unable to connect to any directory
cache for directory info (usually because we don’t know about any yet)
we try a FallbackDir. By default, the directory authorities are also
FallbackDirs.
DirAuthority [nickname] [flags] address:port
fingerprint
Use a nonstandard authoritative directory server at the
provided address and port, with the specified key fingerprint. This option can
be repeated many times, for multiple authoritative directory servers. Flags
are separated by spaces, and determine what kind of an authority this
directory is. By default, an authority is not authoritative for any directory
style or version unless an appropriate flag is given. Tor will use this
authority as a bridge authoritative directory if the "bridge" flag
is set. If a flag "orport= port" is given, Tor will use the
given port when opening encrypted tunnels to the dirserver. If a flag
"weight= num" is given, then the directory server is chosen
randomly with probability proportional to that weight (default 1.0). Lastly,
if a flag "v3ident= fp" is given, the dirserver is a v3
directory authority whose v3 long-term signing key has the fingerprint
fp.
If no DirAuthority line is given, Tor will use the default directory
authorities. NOTE: this option is intended for setting up a private Tor
network with its own directory authorities. If you use it, you will be
distinguishable from other users, because you won’t believe the same
authorities they do.
DirAuthorityFallbackRate NUM
When configured to use both directory authorities and
fallback directories, the directory authorities also work as fallbacks. They
are chosen with their regular weights, multiplied by this number, which should
be 1.0 or less. (Default: 1.0)
DynamicDHGroups 0|1
If this option is set to 1, when running as a server,
generate our own Diffie-Hellman group instead of using the one from
Apache’s mod_ssl. This option may help circumvent censorship based on
static Diffie-Hellman parameters. (Default: 0)
AlternateDirAuthority [nickname] [flags]
address:port fingerprint
AlternateBridgeAuthority [nickname] [flags]
address:port fingerprint
These options behave as DirAuthority, but they replace
fewer of the default directory authorities. Using AlternateDirAuthority
replaces the default Tor directory authorities, but leaves the default bridge
authorities in place. Similarly, AlternateBridgeAuthority replaces the default
bridge authority, but leaves the directory authorities alone.
DisableAllSwap 0|1
If set to 1, Tor will attempt to lock all current and
future memory pages, so that memory cannot be paged out. Windows, OS X and
Solaris are currently not supported. We believe that this feature works on
modern Gnu/Linux distributions, and that it should work on *BSD systems
(untested). This option requires that you start your Tor as root, and you
should use the User option to properly reduce Tor’s privileges.
(Default: 0)
DisableDebuggerAttachment 0|1
If set to 1, Tor will attempt to prevent basic debugging
attachment attempts by other processes. This may also keep Tor from generating
core files if it crashes. It has no impact for users who wish to attach if
they have CAP_SYS_PTRACE or if they are root. We believe that this feature
works on modern Gnu/Linux distributions, and that it may also work on *BSD
systems (untested). Some modern Gnu/Linux systems such as Ubuntu have the
kernel.yama.ptrace_scope sysctl and by default enable it as an attempt to
limit the PTRACE scope for all user processes by default. This feature will
attempt to limit the PTRACE scope for Tor specifically - it will not attempt
to alter the system wide ptrace scope as it may not even exist. If you wish to
attach to Tor with a debugger such as gdb or strace you will want to set this
to 0 for the duration of your debugging. Normal users should leave it on.
Disabling this option while Tor is running is prohibited. (Default: 1)
FetchDirInfoEarly 0|1
If set to 1, Tor will always fetch directory information
like other directory caches, even if you don’t meet the normal criteria
for fetching early. Normal users should leave it off. (Default: 0)
FetchDirInfoExtraEarly 0|1
If set to 1, Tor will fetch directory information before
other directory caches. It will attempt to download directory information
closer to the start of the consensus period. Normal users should leave it off.
(Default: 0)
FetchHidServDescriptors 0|1
If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any hidden service
descriptors from the rendezvous directories. This option is only useful if
you’re using a Tor controller that handles hidden service fetches for
you. (Default: 1)
FetchServerDescriptors 0|1
If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any network status
summaries or server descriptors from the directory servers. This option is
only useful if you’re using a Tor controller that handles directory
fetches for you. (Default: 1)
FetchUselessDescriptors 0|1
If set to 1, Tor will fetch every non-obsolete descriptor
from the authorities that it hears about. Otherwise, it will avoid fetching
useless descriptors, for example for routers that are not running. This option
is useful if you’re using the contributed "exitlist" script
to enumerate Tor nodes that exit to certain addresses. (Default: 0)
HTTPProxy host[:port]
Tor will make all its directory requests through this
host:port (or host:80 if port is not specified), rather than connecting
directly to any directory servers.
HTTPProxyAuthenticator username:password
If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic
HTTP proxy authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of
HTTP proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a patch if
you want it to support others.
HTTPSProxy host[:port]
Tor will make all its OR (SSL) connections through this
host:port (or host:443 if port is not specified), via HTTP CONNECT rather than
connecting directly to servers. You may want to set FascistFirewall to
restrict the set of ports you might try to connect to, if your HTTPS proxy
only allows connecting to certain ports.
HTTPSProxyAuthenticator username:password
If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic
HTTPS proxy authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of
HTTPS proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a patch if
you want it to support others.
Sandbox 0|1
If set to 1, Tor will run securely through the use of a
syscall sandbox. Otherwise the sandbox will be disabled. The option is
currently an experimental feature. (Default: 0)
Socks4Proxy host[:port]
Tor will make all OR connections through the SOCKS 4
proxy at host:port (or host:1080 if port is not specified).
Socks5Proxy host[:port]
Tor will make all OR connections through the SOCKS 5
proxy at host:port (or host:1080 if port is not specified).
Socks5ProxyUsername username
Socks5ProxyPassword password
If defined, authenticate to the SOCKS 5 server using
username and password in accordance to RFC 1929. Both username and password
must be between 1 and 255 characters.
KeepalivePeriod NUM
To keep firewalls from expiring connections, send a
padding keepalive cell every NUM seconds on open connections that are in use.
If the connection has no open circuits, it will instead be closed after NUM
seconds of idleness. (Default: 5 minutes)
Log minSeverity[-maxSeverity]
stderr|stdout|syslog
Send all messages between minSeverity and
maxSeverity to the standard output stream, the standard error stream,
or to the system log. (The "syslog" value is only supported on
Unix.) Recognized severity levels are debug, info, notice, warn, and err. We
advise using "notice" in most cases, since anything more verbose may
provide sensitive information to an attacker who obtains the logs. If only one
severity level is given, all messages of that level or higher will be sent to
the listed destination.
Log minSeverity[-maxSeverity] file FILENAME
As above, but send log messages to the listed filename.
The "Log" option may appear more than once in a configuration file.
Messages are sent to all the logs that match their severity level.
Log
[domain,...]minSeverity[-maxSeverity] ...
file FILENAME
Log
[domain,...]minSeverity[-maxSeverity] ...
stderr|stdout|syslog
As above, but select messages by range of log severity
and by a set of "logging domains". Each logging domain
corresponds to an area of functionality inside Tor. You can specify any number
of severity ranges for a single log statement, each of them prefixed by a
comma-separated list of logging domains. You can prefix a domain with ~ to
indicate negation, and use * to indicate "all domains". If you
specify a severity range without a list of domains, it matches all domains.
This is an advanced feature which is most useful for debugging one or two of
Tor’s subsystems at a time.
The currently recognized domains are: general, crypto, net, config, fs,
protocol, mm, http, app, control, circ, rend, bug, dir, dirserv, or, edge,
acct, hist, and handshake. Domain names are case-insensitive.
For example, "Log [handshake]debug [~net,~mm]info notice stdout" sends
to stdout: all handshake messages of any severity, all info-and-higher
messages from domains other than networking and memory management, and all
messages of severity notice or higher.
LogMessageDomains 0|1
If 1, Tor includes message domains with each log message.
Every log message currently has at least one domain; most currently have
exactly one. This doesn’t affect controller log messages. (Default:
0)
OutboundBindAddress IP
Make all outbound connections originate from the IP
address specified. This is only useful when you have multiple network
interfaces, and you want all of Tor’s outgoing connections to use a
single one. This option may be used twice, once with an IPv4 address and once
with an IPv6 address. This setting will be ignored for connections to the
loopback addresses (127.0.0.0/8 and ::1).
PidFile FILE
On startup, write our PID to FILE. On clean shutdown,
remove FILE.
ProtocolWarnings 0|1
If 1, Tor will log with severity 'warn' various cases of
other parties not following the Tor specification. Otherwise, they are logged
with severity 'info'. (Default: 0)
PredictedPortsRelevanceTime NUM
Set how long, after the client has mad an anonymized
connection to a given port, we will try to make sure that we build circuits to
exits that support that port. The maximum value for this option is 1 hour.
(Default: 1 hour)
RunAsDaemon 0|1
If 1, Tor forks and daemonizes to the background. This
option has no effect on Windows; instead you should use the --service
command-line option. (Default: 0)
LogTimeGranularity NUM
Set the resolution of timestamps in Tor’s logs to
NUM milliseconds. NUM must be positive and either a divisor or a multiple of 1
second. Note that this option only controls the granularity written by Tor to
a file or console log. Tor does not (for example) "batch up" log
messages to affect times logged by a controller, times attached to syslog
messages, or the mtime fields on log files. (Default: 1 second)
SafeLogging 0|1|relay
Tor can scrub potentially sensitive strings from log
messages (e.g. addresses) by replacing them with the string [scrubbed]. This
way logs can still be useful, but they don’t leave behind personally
identifying information about what sites a user might have visited.
If this option is set to 0, Tor will not perform any scrubbing, if it is set to
1, all potentially sensitive strings are replaced. If it is set to relay, all
log messages generated when acting as a relay are sanitized, but all messages
generated when acting as a client are not. (Default: 1)
User UID
On startup, setuid to this user and setgid to their
primary group.
HardwareAccel 0|1
If non-zero, try to use built-in (static) crypto hardware
acceleration when available. (Default: 0)
AccelName NAME
When using OpenSSL hardware crypto acceleration attempt
to load the dynamic engine of this name. This must be used for any dynamic
hardware engine. Names can be verified with the openssl engine command.
AccelDir DIR
Specify this option if using dynamic hardware
acceleration and the engine implementation library resides somewhere other
than the OpenSSL default.
AvoidDiskWrites 0|1
If non-zero, try to write to disk less frequently than we
would otherwise. This is useful when running on flash memory or other media
that support only a limited number of writes. (Default: 0)
CircuitPriorityHalflife NUM1
If this value is set, we override the default algorithm
for choosing which circuit’s cell to deliver or relay next. When the
value is 0, we round-robin between the active circuits on a connection,
delivering one cell from each in turn. When the value is positive, we prefer
delivering cells from whichever connection has the lowest weighted cell count,
where cells are weighted exponentially according to the supplied
CircuitPriorityHalflife value (in seconds). If this option is not set at all,
we use the behavior recommended in the current consensus networkstatus. This
is an advanced option; you generally shouldn’t have to mess with it.
(Default: not set)
DisableIOCP 0|1
If Tor was built to use the Libevent’s
"bufferevents" networking code and you’re running on Windows,
setting this option to 1 will tell Libevent not to use the Windows IOCP
networking API. (Default: 1)
UserspaceIOCPBuffers 0|1
If IOCP is enabled (see DisableIOCP above), setting this
option to 1 will tell Tor to disable kernel-space TCP buffers, in order to
avoid needless copy operations and try not to run out of non-paged RAM. This
feature is experimental; don’t use it yet unless you’re eager to
help tracking down bugs. (Default: 0)
UseFilteringSSLBufferevents 0|1
Tells Tor to do its SSL communication using a chain of
bufferevents: one for SSL and one for networking. This option has no effect if
bufferevents are disabled (in which case it can’t turn on), or if IOCP
bufferevents are enabled (in which case it can’t turn off). This option
is useful for debugging only; most users shouldn’t touch it. (Default:
0)
CountPrivateBandwidth 0|1
If this option is set, then Tor’s rate-limiting
applies not only to remote connections, but also to connections to private
addresses like 127.0.0.1 or 10.0.0.1. This is mostly useful for debugging
rate-limiting. (Default: 0)
CLIENT OPTIONS¶
The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if SocksPort, TransPort, DNSPort, or NATDPort is non-zero): AllowInvalidNodes entry|exit|middle|introduction| rendezvous|...If some Tor servers are obviously not working right, the
directory authorities can manually mark them as invalid, meaning that
it’s not recommended you use them for entry or exit positions in your
circuits. You can opt to use them in some circuit positions, though. The
default is "middle,rendezvous", and other choices are not
advised.
ExcludeSingleHopRelays 0|1
This option controls whether circuits built by Tor will
include relays with the AllowSingleHopExits flag set to true. If
ExcludeSingleHopRelays is set to 0, these relays will be included. Note that
these relays might be at higher risk of being seized or observed, so they are
not normally included. Also note that relatively few clients turn off this
option, so using these relays might make your client stand out. (Default:
1)
Bridge [transport] IP:ORPort [fingerprint]
When set along with UseBridges, instructs Tor to use the
relay at "IP:ORPort" as a "bridge" relaying into the Tor
network. If "fingerprint" is provided (using the same format as for
DirAuthority), we will verify that the relay running at that location has the
right fingerprint. We also use fingerprint to look up the bridge descriptor at
the bridge authority, if it’s provided and if
UpdateBridgesFromAuthority is set too.
If "transport" is provided, and matches to a ClientTransportPlugin
line, we use that pluggable transports proxy to transfer data to the
bridge.
LearnCircuitBuildTimeout 0|1
If 0, CircuitBuildTimeout adaptive learning is disabled.
(Default: 1)
CircuitBuildTimeout NUM
Try for at most NUM seconds when building circuits. If
the circuit isn’t open in that time, give up on it. If
LearnCircuitBuildTimeout is 1, this value serves as the initial value to use
before a timeout is learned. If LearnCircuitBuildTimeout is 0, this value is
the only value used. (Default: 60 seconds)
CircuitIdleTimeout NUM
If we have kept a clean (never used) circuit around for
NUM seconds, then close it. This way when the Tor client is entirely idle, it
can expire all of its circuits, and then expire its TLS connections. Also, if
we end up making a circuit that is not useful for exiting any of the requests
we’re receiving, it won’t forever take up a slot in the circuit
list. (Default: 1 hour)
CircuitStreamTimeout NUM
If non-zero, this option overrides our internal timeout
schedule for how many seconds until we detach a stream from a circuit and try
a new circuit. If your network is particularly slow, you might want to set
this to a number like 60. (Default: 0)
ClientOnly 0|1
If set to 1, Tor will not run as a relay or serve
directory requests, even if the ORPort, ExtORPort, or DirPort options are set.
(This config option is mostly unnecessary: we added it back when we were
considering having Tor clients auto-promote themselves to being relays if they
were stable and fast enough. The current behavior is simply that Tor is a
client unless ORPort, ExtORPort, or DirPort are configured.) (Default:
0)
ExcludeNodes node,node,...
A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes
and address patterns of nodes to avoid when building a circuit. (Example:
ExcludeNodes SlowServer, ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234, {cc},
255.254.0.0/8)
By default, this option is treated as a preference that Tor is allowed to
override in order to keep working. For example, if you try to connect to a
hidden service, but you have excluded all of the hidden service’s
introduction points, Tor will connect to one of them anyway. If you do not
want this behavior, set the StrictNodes option (documented below).
Note also that if you are a relay, this (and the other node selection options
below) only affects your own circuits that Tor builds for you. Clients can
still build circuits through you to any node. Controllers can tell Tor to
build circuits through any node.
Country codes are case-insensitive. The code "{??}" refers to nodes
whose country can’t be identified. No country code, including {??},
works if no GeoIPFile can be loaded. See also the GeoIPExcludeUnknown option
below.
ExcludeExitNodes node,node,...
A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes
and address patterns of nodes to never use when picking an exit node---that
is, a node that delivers traffic for you outside the Tor network. Note that
any node listed in ExcludeNodes is automatically considered to be part of this
list too. See also the caveats on the "ExitNodes" option
below.
GeoIPExcludeUnknown 0|1|auto
If this option is set to auto, then whenever any
country code is set in ExcludeNodes or ExcludeExitNodes, all nodes with
unknown country ({??} and possibly {A1}) are treated as excluded as well. If
this option is set to 1, then all unknown countries are treated as
excluded in ExcludeNodes and ExcludeExitNodes. This option has no effect when
a GeoIP file isn’t configured or can’t be found. (Default:
auto)
ExitNodes node,node,...
A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes
and address patterns of nodes to use as exit node---that is, a node that
delivers traffic for you outside the Tor network.
Note that if you list too few nodes here, or if you exclude too many exit nodes
with ExcludeExitNodes, you can degrade functionality. For example, if none of
the exits you list allows traffic on port 80 or 443, you won’t be able
to browse the web.
Note also that not every circuit is used to deliver traffic outside of the Tor
network. It is normal to see non-exit circuits (such as those used to connect
to hidden services, those that do directory fetches, those used for relay
reachability self-tests, and so on) that end at a non-exit node. To keep a
node from being used entirely, see ExcludeNodes and StrictNodes.
The ExcludeNodes option overrides this option: any node listed in both ExitNodes
and ExcludeNodes is treated as excluded.
The .exit address notation, if enabled via AllowDotExit, overrides this
option.
EntryNodes node,node,...
A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, and country
codes of nodes to use for the first hop in your normal circuits. Normal
circuits include all circuits except for direct connections to directory
servers. The Bridge option overrides this option; if you have configured
bridges and UseBridges is 1, the Bridges are used as your entry nodes.
The ExcludeNodes option overrides this option: any node listed in both
EntryNodes and ExcludeNodes is treated as excluded.
StrictNodes 0|1
If StrictNodes is set to 1, Tor will treat the
ExcludeNodes option as a requirement to follow for all the circuits you
generate, even if doing so will break functionality for you. If StrictNodes is
set to 0, Tor will still try to avoid nodes in the ExcludeNodes list, but it
will err on the side of avoiding unexpected errors. Specifically, StrictNodes
0 tells Tor that it is okay to use an excluded node when it is
necessary to perform relay reachability self-tests, connect to a hidden
service, provide a hidden service to a client, fulfill a .exit request, upload
directory information, or download directory information. (Default: 0)
FascistFirewall 0|1
If 1, Tor will only create outgoing connections to ORs
running on ports that your firewall allows (defaults to 80 and 443; see
FirewallPorts). This will allow you to run Tor as a client behind a
firewall with restrictive policies, but will not allow you to run as a server
behind such a firewall. If you prefer more fine-grained control, use
ReachableAddresses instead.
FirewallPorts PORTS
A list of ports that your firewall allows you to connect
to. Only used when FascistFirewall is set. This option is deprecated;
use ReachableAddresses instead. (Default: 80, 443)
ReachableAddresses ADDR[/MASK][:PORT]...
A comma-separated list of IP addresses and ports that
your firewall allows you to connect to. The format is as for the addresses in
ExitPolicy, except that "accept" is understood unless
"reject" is explicitly provided. For example, 'ReachableAddresses
99.0.0.0/8, reject 18.0.0.0/8:80, accept *:80' means that your firewall allows
connections to everything inside net 99, rejects port 80 connections to net
18, and accepts connections to port 80 otherwise. (Default: 'accept
*:*'.)
ReachableDirAddresses ADDR[/MASK][:PORT]...
Like ReachableAddresses, a list of addresses and
ports. Tor will obey these restrictions when fetching directory information,
using standard HTTP GET requests. If not set explicitly then the value of
ReachableAddresses is used. If HTTPProxy is set then these
connections will go through that proxy.
ReachableORAddresses ADDR[/MASK][:PORT]...
Like ReachableAddresses, a list of addresses and
ports. Tor will obey these restrictions when connecting to Onion Routers,
using TLS/SSL. If not set explicitly then the value of
ReachableAddresses is used. If HTTPSProxy is set then these
connections will go through that proxy.
The separation between ReachableORAddresses and
ReachableDirAddresses is only interesting when you are connecting
through proxies (see HTTPProxy and HTTPSProxy). Most proxies
limit TLS connections (which Tor uses to connect to Onion Routers) to port
443, and some limit HTTP GET requests (which Tor uses for fetching directory
information) to port 80.
HidServAuth onion-address auth-cookie [service-name]
Client authorization for a hidden service. Valid onion
addresses contain 16 characters in a-z2-7 plus ".onion", and valid
auth cookies contain 22 characters in A-Za-z0-9+/. The service name is only
used for internal purposes, e.g., for Tor controllers. This option may be used
multiple times for different hidden services. If a hidden service uses
authorization and this option is not set, the hidden service is not
accessible. Hidden services can be configured to require authorization using
the HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient option.
CloseHSClientCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout 0|1
If 1, Tor will close unfinished hidden service client
circuits which have not moved closer to connecting to their destination hidden
service when their internal state has not changed for the duration of the
current circuit-build timeout. Otherwise, such circuits will be left open, in
the hope that they will finish connecting to their destination hidden
services. In either case, another set of introduction and rendezvous circuits
for the same destination hidden service will be launched. (Default: 0)
CloseHSServiceRendCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout 0|1
If 1, Tor will close unfinished hidden-service-side
rendezvous circuits after the current circuit-build timeout. Otherwise, such
circuits will be left open, in the hope that they will finish connecting to
their destinations. In either case, another rendezvous circuit for the same
destination client will be launched. (Default: 0)
LongLivedPorts PORTS
A list of ports for services that tend to have
long-running connections (e.g. chat and interactive shells). Circuits for
streams that use these ports will contain only high-uptime nodes, to reduce
the chance that a node will go down before the stream is finished. Note that
the list is also honored for circuits (both client and service side) involving
hidden services whose virtual port is in this list. (Default: 21, 22, 706,
1863, 5050, 5190, 5222, 5223, 6523, 6667, 6697, 8300)
MapAddress address newaddress
When a request for address arrives to Tor, it will
transform to newaddress before processing it. For example, if you always want
connections to www.example.com to exit via torserver (where
torserver is the nickname of the server), use "MapAddress
www.example.com www.example.com.torserver.exit". If the value is prefixed
with a "*.", matches an entire domain. For example, if you always
want connections to example.com and any if its subdomains to exit via
torserver (where torserver is the nickname of the server), use
"MapAddress *.example.com *.example.com.torserver.exit". (Note the
leading "*." in each part of the directive.) You can also redirect
all subdomains of a domain to a single address. For example, "MapAddress
*.example.com www.example.com".
NOTES:
NewCircuitPeriod NUM
1.When evaluating MapAddress expressions Tor stops when
it hits the most recently added expression that matches the requested address.
So if you have the following in your torrc, www.torproject.org will map to
1.1.1.1:
MapAddress www.torproject.org 2.2.2.2 MapAddress www.torproject.org 1.1.1.1
2.Tor evaluates the MapAddress configuration until it
finds no matches. So if you have the following in your torrc,
www.torproject.org will map to 2.2.2.2:
MapAddress 1.1.1.1 2.2.2.2 MapAddress www.torproject.org 1.1.1.1
3.The following MapAddress expression is invalid (and
will be ignored) because you cannot map from a specific address to a wildcard
address:
MapAddress www.torproject.org *.torproject.org.torserver.exit
4.Using a wildcard to match only part of a string (as in
*ample.com) is also invalid.
Every NUM seconds consider whether to build a new
circuit. (Default: 30 seconds)
MaxCircuitDirtiness NUM
Feel free to reuse a circuit that was first used at most
NUM seconds ago, but never attach a new stream to a circuit that is too old.
For hidden services, this applies to the last time a circuit was used,
not the first. (Default: 10 minutes)
MaxClientCircuitsPending NUM
Do not allow more than NUM circuits to be pending at a
time for handling client streams. A circuit is pending if we have begun
constructing it, but it has not yet been completely constructed. (Default:
32)
NodeFamily node,node,...
The Tor servers, defined by their identity fingerprints
or nicknames, constitute a "family" of similar or co-administered
servers, so never use any two of them in the same circuit. Defining a
NodeFamily is only needed when a server doesn’t list the family itself
(with MyFamily). This option can be used multiple times. In addition to nodes,
you can also list IP address and ranges and country codes in {curly
braces}.
EnforceDistinctSubnets 0|1
If 1, Tor will not put two servers whose IP addresses are
"too close" on the same circuit. Currently, two addresses are
"too close" if they lie in the same /16 range. (Default: 1)
SOCKSPort [address:]port|auto [flags]
[isolation flags]
Open this port to listen for connections from
SOCKS-speaking applications. Set this to 0 if you don’t want to allow
application connections via SOCKS. Set it to "auto" to have Tor pick
a port for you. This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to
multiple addresses/ports. (Default: 9050)
The isolation flags arguments give Tor rules for which streams received
on this SOCKSPort are allowed to share circuits with one another. Recognized
isolation flags are:
IsolateClientAddr
Don’t share circuits with streams from a different
client address. (On by default and strongly recommended; you can disable it
with NoIsolateClientAddr.)
IsolateSOCKSAuth
Don’t share circuits with streams for which
different SOCKS authentication was provided. (On by default; you can disable
it with NoIsolateSOCKSAuth.)
IsolateClientProtocol
Don’t share circuits with streams using a
different protocol. (SOCKS 4, SOCKS 5, TransPort connections, NATDPort
connections, and DNSPort requests are all considered to be different
protocols.)
IsolateDestPort
Don’t share circuits with streams targetting a
different destination port.
IsolateDestAddr
Don’t share circuits with streams targetting a
different destination address.
SessionGroup=INT
If no other isolation rules would prevent it, allow
streams on this port to share circuits with streams from every other port with
the same session group. (By default, streams received on different SOCKSPorts,
TransPorts, etc are always isolated from one another. This option overrides
that behavior.)
Other recognized flags for a SOCKSPort are:
NoIPv4Traffic
SOCKSListenAddress IP[:PORT]
Tell exits to not connect to IPv4 addresses in response
to SOCKS requests on this connection.
IPv6Traffic
Tell exits to allow IPv6 addresses in response to SOCKS
requests on this connection, so long as SOCKS5 is in use. (SOCKS4 can’t
handle IPv6.)
PreferIPv6
Tells exits that, if a host has both an IPv4 and an IPv6
address, we would prefer to connect to it via IPv6. (IPv4 is the default.)
NOTE: Although this option allows you to specify an IP address other than
localhost, you should do so only with extreme caution. The SOCKS protocol is
unencrypted and (as we use it) unauthenticated, so exposing it in this way
could leak your information to anybody watching your network, and allow
anybody to use your computer as an open proxy.
CacheIPv4DNS
Tells the client to remember IPv4 DNS answers we receive
from exit nodes via this connection. (On by default.)
CacheIPv6DNS
Tells the client to remember IPv6 DNS answers we receive
from exit nodes via this connection.
CacheDNS
Tells the client to remember all DNS answers we receive
from exit nodes via this connection.
UseIPv4Cache
Tells the client to use any cached IPv4 DNS answers we
have when making requests via this connection. (NOTE: This option, along
UseIPv6Cache and UseDNSCache, can harm your anonymity, and probably
won’t help performance as much as you might expect. Use with
care!)
UseIPv6Cache
Tells the client to use any cached IPv6 DNS answers we
have when making requests via this connection.
UseDNSCache
Tells the client to use any cached DNS answers we have
when making requests via this connection.
PreferIPv6Automap
When serving a hostname lookup request on this port that
should get automapped (according to AutomapHostsOnResove), if we could return
either an IPv4 or an IPv6 answer, prefer an IPv6 answer. (On by
default.)
PreferSOCKSNoAuth
Ordinarily, when an application offers both
"username/password authentication" and "no authentication"
to Tor via SOCKS5, Tor selects username/password authentication so that
IsolateSOCKSAuth can work. This can confuse some applications, if they offer a
username/password combination then get confused when asked for one. You can
disable this behavior, so that Tor will select "No authentication"
when IsolateSOCKSAuth is disabled, or when this option is set.
Bind to this address to listen for connections from
Socks-speaking applications. (Default: 127.0.0.1) You can also specify a port
(e.g. 192.168.0.1:9100). This directive can be specified multiple times to
bind to multiple addresses/ports. (DEPRECATED: As of 0.2.3.x-alpha, you can
now use multiple SOCKSPort entries, and provide addresses for SOCKSPort
entries, so SOCKSListenAddress no longer has a purpose. For backward
compatibility, SOCKSListenAddress is only allowed when SOCKSPort is just a
port number.)
SocksPolicy policy,policy,...
Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can
connect to the SocksPort and DNSPort ports. The policies have the same form as
exit policies below, except that port specifiers are ignored. Any address not
matched by some entry in the policy is accepted.
SocksTimeout NUM
Let a socks connection wait NUM seconds handshaking, and
NUM seconds unattached waiting for an appropriate circuit, before we fail it.
(Default: 2 minutes)
TokenBucketRefillInterval NUM [msec|second]
Set the refill interval of Tor’s token bucket to
NUM milliseconds. NUM must be between 1 and 1000, inclusive. Note that the
configured bandwidth limits are still expressed in bytes per second: this
option only affects the frequency with which Tor checks to see whether
previously exhausted connections may read again. (Default: 100 msec)
TrackHostExits host,.domain,...
For each value in the comma separated list, Tor will
track recent connections to hosts that match this value and attempt to reuse
the same exit node for each. If the value is prepended with a '.', it is
treated as matching an entire domain. If one of the values is just a '.', it
means match everything. This option is useful if you frequently connect to
sites that will expire all your authentication cookies (i.e. log you out) if
your IP address changes. Note that this option does have the disadvantage of
making it more clear that a given history is associated with a single user.
However, most people who would wish to observe this will observe it through
cookies or other protocol-specific means anyhow.
TrackHostExitsExpire NUM
Since exit servers go up and down, it is desirable to
expire the association between host and exit server after NUM seconds. The
default is 1800 seconds (30 minutes).
UpdateBridgesFromAuthority 0|1
When set (along with UseBridges), Tor will try to fetch
bridge descriptors from the configured bridge authorities when feasible. It
will fall back to a direct request if the authority responds with a 404.
(Default: 0)
UseBridges 0|1
When set, Tor will fetch descriptors for each bridge
listed in the "Bridge" config lines, and use these relays as both
entry guards and directory guards. (Default: 0)
UseEntryGuards 0|1
If this option is set to 1, we pick a few long-term entry
servers, and try to stick with them. This is desirable because constantly
changing servers increases the odds that an adversary who owns some servers
will observe a fraction of your paths. (Default: 1)
UseEntryGuardsAsDirGuards 0|1
If this option is set to 1, and UseEntryGuards is also
set to 1, we try to use our entry guards as directory guards, and failing
that, pick more nodes to act as our directory guards. This helps prevent an
adversary from enumerating clients. It’s only available for clients
(non-relay, non-bridge) that aren’t configured to download any
non-default directory material. It doesn’t currently do anything when
we lack a live consensus. (Default: 1)
NumEntryGuards NUM
If UseEntryGuards is set to 1, we will try to pick a
total of NUM routers as long-term entries for our circuits. If NUM is 0, we
try to learn the number from the NumEntryGuards consensus parameter, and
default to 3 if the consensus parameter isn’t set. (Default: 0)
NumDirectoryGuards NUM
If UseEntryGuardsAsDirectoryGuards is enabled, we try to
make sure we have at least NUM routers to use as directory guards. If this
option is set to 0, use the value from the NumDirectoryGuards consensus
parameter, falling back to the value from NumEntryGuards if the consensus
parameter is 0 or isn’t set. (Default: 0)
GuardLifetime N days|weeks|months
If nonzero, and UseEntryGuards is set, minimum time to
keep a guard before picking a new one. If zero, we use the GuardLifetime
parameter from the consensus directory. No value here may be less than 1 month
or greater than 5 years; out-of-range values are clamped. (Default: 0)
SafeSocks 0|1
When this option is enabled, Tor will reject application
connections that use unsafe variants of the socks protocol — ones that
only provide an IP address, meaning the application is doing a DNS resolve
first. Specifically, these are socks4 and socks5 when not doing remote DNS.
(Default: 0)
TestSocks 0|1
When this option is enabled, Tor will make a notice-level
log entry for each connection to the Socks port indicating whether the request
used a safe socks protocol or an unsafe one (see above entry on SafeSocks).
This helps to determine whether an application using Tor is possibly leaking
DNS requests. (Default: 0)
WarnUnsafeSocks 0|1
When this option is enabled, Tor will warn whenever a
request is received that only contains an IP address instead of a hostname.
Allowing applications to do DNS resolves themselves is usually a bad idea and
can leak your location to attackers. (Default: 1)
VirtualAddrNetworkIPv4 Address/bits
VirtualAddrNetworkIPv6 [Address]/bits
When Tor needs to assign a virtual (unused) address
because of a MAPADDRESS command from the controller or the
AutomapHostsOnResolve feature, Tor picks an unassigned address from this
range. (Defaults: 127.192.0.0/10 and [FE80::]/10 respectively.)
When providing proxy server service to a network of computers using a tool like
dns-proxy-tor, change the IPv4 network to "10.192.0.0/10" or
"172.16.0.0/12" and change the IPv6 network to "[FC00]/7".
The default VirtualAddrNetwork address ranges on a properly configured
machine will route to the loopback or link-local interface. For local use, no
change to the default VirtualAddrNetwork setting is needed.
AllowNonRFC953Hostnames 0|1
When this option is disabled, Tor blocks hostnames
containing illegal characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an
exit node to be resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve URLs
and so on. (Default: 0)
AllowDotExit 0|1
If enabled, we convert
"www.google.com.foo.exit" addresses on the
SocksPort/TransPort/NATDPort into "www.google.com" addresses that
exit from the node "foo". Disabled by default since attacking
websites and exit relays can use it to manipulate your path selection.
(Default: 0)
FastFirstHopPK 0|1|auto
When this option is disabled, Tor uses the public key
step for the first hop of creating circuits. Skipping it is generally safe
since we have already used TLS to authenticate the relay and to establish
forward-secure keys. Turning this option off makes circuit building a little
slower. Setting this option to "auto" takes advice from the
authorities in the latest consensus about whether to use this feature.
Note that Tor will always use the public key step for the first hop if
it’s operating as a relay, and it will never use the public key step if
it doesn’t yet know the onion key of the first hop. (Default:
auto)
TransPort [address:]port|auto [isolation
flags]
Open this port to listen for transparent proxy
connections. Set this to 0 if you don’t want to allow transparent proxy
connections. Set the port to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you.
This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple
addresses/ports. See SOCKSPort for an explanation of isolation flags.
TransPort requires OS support for transparent proxies, such as BSDs' pf or
Linux’s IPTables. If you’re planning to use Tor as a transparent
proxy for a network, you’ll want to examine and change
VirtualAddrNetwork from the default setting. You’ll also want to set
the TransListenAddress option for the network you’d like to proxy.
(Default: 0)
TransListenAddress IP[:PORT]
Bind to this address to listen for transparent proxy
connections. (Default: 127.0.0.1). This is useful for exporting a transparent
proxy server to an entire network. (DEPRECATED: As of 0.2.3.x-alpha, you can
now use multiple TransPort entries, and provide addresses for TransPort
entries, so TransListenAddress no longer has a purpose. For backward
compatibility, TransListenAddress is only allowed when TransPort is just a
port number.)
TransProxyType default|TPROXY|ipfw|pf-divert
TransProxyType may only be enabled when there is
transparent proxy listener enabled.
Set this to "TPROXY" if you wish to be able to use the TPROXY Linux
module to transparently proxy connections that are configured using the
TransPort option. This setting lets the listener on the TransPort accept
connections for all addresses, even when the TransListenAddress is configured
for an internal address. Detailed information on how to configure the TPROXY
feature can be found in the Linux kernel source tree in the file
Documentation/networking/tproxy.txt.
Set this option to "ipfw" to use the FreeBSD ipfw interface.
On *BSD operating systems when using pf, set this to "pf-divert" to
take advantage of divert-to rules, which do not modify the packets like rdr-to
rules do. Detailed information on how to configure pf to use divert-to rules
can be found in the pf.conf(5) manual page. On OpenBSD, divert-to is available
to use on versions greater than or equal to OpenBSD 4.4.
Set this to "default", or leave it unconfigured, to use regular
IPTables on Linux, or to use pf rdr-to rules on *BSD systems.
(Default: "default".)
NATDPort [address:]port|auto [isolation
flags]
Open this port to listen for connections from old
versions of ipfw (as included in old versions of FreeBSD, etc) using the NATD
protocol. Use 0 if you don’t want to allow NATD connections. Set the
port to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you. This directive can
be specified multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports. See SOCKSPort
for an explanation of isolation flags.
This option is only for people who cannot use TransPort. (Default: 0)
NATDListenAddress IP[:PORT]
Bind to this address to listen for NATD connections.
(DEPRECATED: As of 0.2.3.x-alpha, you can now use multiple NATDPort entries,
and provide addresses for NATDPort entries, so NATDListenAddress no longer has
a purpose. For backward compatibility, NATDListenAddress is only allowed when
NATDPort is just a port number.)
AutomapHostsOnResolve 0|1
When this option is enabled, and we get a request to
resolve an address that ends with one of the suffixes in
AutomapHostsSuffixes, we map an unused virtual address to that address,
and return the new virtual address. This is handy for making
".onion" addresses work with applications that resolve an address
and then connect to it. (Default: 0)
AutomapHostsSuffixes SUFFIX,SUFFIX,...
A comma-separated list of suffixes to use with
AutomapHostsOnResolve. The "." suffix is equivalent to
"all addresses." (Default: .exit,.onion).
DNSPort [address:]port|auto [isolation flags]
If non-zero, open this port to listen for UDP DNS
requests, and resolve them anonymously. This port only handles A, AAAA, and
PTR requests---it doesn’t handle arbitrary DNS request types. Set the
port to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you. This directive can
be specified multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports. See SOCKSPort
for an explanation of isolation flags. (Default: 0)
DNSListenAddress IP[:PORT]
Bind to this address to listen for DNS connections.
(DEPRECATED: As of 0.2.3.x-alpha, you can now use multiple DNSPort entries,
and provide addresses for DNSPort entries, so DNSListenAddress no longer has a
purpose. For backward compatibility, DNSListenAddress is only allowed when
DNSPort is just a port number.)
ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses 0|1
If true, Tor does not believe any anonymously retrieved
DNS answer that tells it that an address resolves to an internal address (like
127.0.0.1 or 192.168.0.1). This option prevents certain browser-based attacks;
don’t turn it off unless you know what you’re doing. (Default:
1)
ClientRejectInternalAddresses 0|1
If true, Tor does not try to fulfill requests to connect
to an internal address (like 127.0.0.1 or 192.168.0.1) unless a exit node
is specifically requested (for example, via a .exit hostname, or a
controller request). (Default: 1)
DownloadExtraInfo 0|1
If true, Tor downloads and caches "extra-info"
documents. These documents contain information about servers other than the
information in their regular router descriptors. Tor does not use this
information for anything itself; to save bandwidth, leave this option turned
off. (Default: 0)
WarnPlaintextPorts port,port,...
Tells Tor to issue a warnings whenever the user tries to
make an anonymous connection to one of these ports. This option is designed to
alert users to services that risk sending passwords in the clear. (Default:
23,109,110,143)
RejectPlaintextPorts port,port,...
Like WarnPlaintextPorts, but instead of warning about
risky port uses, Tor will instead refuse to make the connection. (Default:
None)
AllowSingleHopCircuits 0|1
When this option is set, the attached Tor controller can
use relays that have the AllowSingleHopExits option turned on to build
one-hop Tor connections. (Default: 0)
OptimisticData 0|1|auto
When this option is set, and Tor is using an exit node
that supports the feature, it will try optimistically to send data to the exit
node without waiting for the exit node to report whether the connection
succeeded. This can save a round-trip time for protocols like HTTP where the
client talks first. If OptimisticData is set to auto, Tor will look at
the UseOptimisticData parameter in the networkstatus. (Default: auto)
Tor2webMode 0|1
When this option is set, Tor connects to hidden services
non-anonymously. This option also disables client connections to
non-hidden-service hostnames through Tor. It must only be used when
running a tor2web Hidden Service web proxy. To enable this option the compile
time flag --enable-tor2webmode must be specified. (Default: 0)
UseMicrodescriptors 0|1|auto
Microdescriptors are a smaller version of the information
that Tor needs in order to build its circuits. Using microdescriptors makes
Tor clients download less directory information, thus saving bandwidth.
Directory caches need to fetch regular descriptors and microdescriptors, so
this option doesn’t save any bandwidth for them. If this option is set
to "auto" (recommended) then it is on for all clients that do not
set FetchUselessDescriptors. (Default: auto)
UseNTorHandshake 0|1|auto
The "ntor" circuit-creation handshake is faster
and (we think) more secure than the original ("TAP") circuit
handshake, but starting to use it too early might make your client stand out.
If this option is 0, your Tor client won’t use the ntor handshake. If
it’s 1, your Tor client will use the ntor handshake to extend circuits
through servers that support it. If this option is "auto", then your
client will use the ntor handshake once enough directory authorities recommend
it. (Default: 1)
PathBiasCircThreshold NUM
PathBiasNoticeRate NUM
PathBiasWarnRate NUM
PathBiasExtremeRate NUM
PathBiasDropGuards NUM
PathBiasScaleThreshold NUM
These options override the default behavior of
Tor’s ( currently experimental) path bias detection algorithm.
To try to find broken or misbehaving guard nodes, Tor looks for nodes where
more than a certain fraction of circuits through that guard fail to get built.
The PathBiasCircThreshold option controls how many circuits we need to build
through a guard before we make these checks. The PathBiasNoticeRate,
PathBiasWarnRate and PathBiasExtremeRate options control what fraction of
circuits must succeed through a guard so we won’t write log messages.
If less than PathBiasExtremeRate circuits succeed and
PathBiasDropGuards is set to 1, we disable use of that guard.
When we have seen more than PathBiasScaleThreshold circuits through a guard, we
scale our observations by 0.5 (governed by the consensus) so that new
observations don’t get swamped by old ones.
By default, or if a negative value is provided for one of these options, Tor
uses reasonable defaults from the networkstatus consensus document. If no
defaults are available there, these options default to 150, .70, .50, .30, 0,
and 300 respectively.
PathBiasUseThreshold NUM
PathBiasNoticeUseRate NUM
PathBiasExtremeUseRate NUM
PathBiasScaleUseThreshold NUM
Similar to the above options, these options override the
default behavior of Tor’s ( currently experimental) path use
bias detection algorithm.
Where as the path bias parameters govern thresholds for successfully building
circuits, these four path use bias parameters govern thresholds only for
circuit usage. Circuits which receive no stream usage are not counted by this
detection algorithm. A used circuit is considered successful if it is capable
of carrying streams or otherwise receiving well-formed responses to RELAY
cells.
By default, or if a negative value is provided for one of these options, Tor
uses reasonable defaults from the networkstatus consensus document. If no
defaults are available there, these options default to 20, .80, .60, and 100,
respectively.
ClientUseIPv6 0|1
If this option is set to 1, Tor might connect to entry
nodes over IPv6. Note that clients configured with an IPv6 address in a
Bridge line will try connecting over IPv6 even if ClientUseIPv6
is set to 0. (Default: 0)
ClientPreferIPv6ORPort 0|1
If this option is set to 1, Tor prefers an OR port with
an IPv6 address over one with IPv4 if a given entry node has both. Other
things may influence the choice. This option breaks a tie to the favor of
IPv6. (Default: 0)
PathsNeededToBuildCircuits NUM
Tor clients don’t build circuits for user traffic
until they know about enough of the network so that they could potentially
construct enough of the possible paths through the network. If this option is
set to a fraction between 0.25 and 0.95, Tor won’t build circuits until
it has enough descriptors or microdescriptors to construct that fraction of
possible paths. Note that setting this option too low can make your Tor client
less anonymous, and setting it too high can prevent your Tor client from
bootstrapping. If this option is negative, Tor will use a default value chosen
by the directory authorities. (Default: -1.)
Support022HiddenServices 0|1|auto
Tor hidden services running versions before 0.2.3.x
required clients to send timestamps, which can potentially be used to
distinguish clients whose view of the current time is skewed. If this option
is set to 0, we do not send this timestamp, and hidden services on obsolete
Tor versions will not work. If this option is set to 1, we send the timestamp.
If this optoin is "auto", we take a recommendation from the latest
consensus document. (Default: auto)
SERVER OPTIONS¶
The following options are useful only for servers (that is, if ORPort is non-zero): Address addressThe IP address or fully qualified domain name of this
server (e.g. moria.mit.edu). You can leave this unset, and Tor will guess your
IP address. This IP address is the one used to tell clients and other servers
where to find your Tor server; it doesn’t affect the IP that your Tor
client binds to. To bind to a different address, use the *ListenAddress and
OutboundBindAddress options.
AllowSingleHopExits 0|1
This option controls whether clients can use this server
as a single hop proxy. If set to 1, clients can use this server as an exit
even if it is the only hop in the circuit. Note that most clients will refuse
to use servers that set this option, since most clients have
ExcludeSingleHopRelays set. (Default: 0)
AssumeReachable 0|1
This option is used when bootstrapping a new Tor network.
If set to 1, don’t do self-reachability testing; just upload your
server descriptor immediately. If AuthoritativeDirectory is also set,
this option instructs the dirserver to bypass remote reachability testing too
and list all connected servers as running.
BridgeRelay 0|1
Sets the relay to act as a "bridge" with
respect to relaying connections from bridge users to the Tor network. It
mainly causes Tor to publish a server descriptor to the bridge database,
rather than publishing a relay descriptor to the public directory
authorities.
ContactInfo email_address
Administrative contact information for this relay or
bridge. This line can be used to contact you if your relay or bridge is
misconfigured or something else goes wrong. Note that we archive and publish
all descriptors containing these lines and that Google indexes them, so
spammers might also collect them. You may want to obscure the fact that
it’s an email address and/or generate a new address for this
purpose.
ExitPolicy policy,policy,...
Set an exit policy for this server. Each policy is of the
form "
accept|rejectADDR[/MASK][:PORT]". If /
MASK is omitted then this policy just applies to the host given.
Instead of giving a host or network you can also use "*" to denote
the universe (0.0.0.0/0). PORT can be a single port number, an interval
of ports " FROM_PORT-TO_PORT", or "*". If
PORT is omitted, that means "*".
For example, "accept 18.7.22.69:*,reject 18.0.0.0/8:*,accept *:*"
would reject any traffic destined for MIT except for web.mit.edu, and accept
anything else.
To specify all internal and link-local networks (including 0.0.0.0/8,
169.254.0.0/16, 127.0.0.0/8, 192.168.0.0/16, 10.0.0.0/8, and 172.16.0.0/12),
you can use the "private" alias instead of an address. These
addresses are rejected by default (at the beginning of your exit policy),
along with your public IP address, unless you set the ExitPolicyRejectPrivate
config option to 0. For example, once you’ve done that, you could allow
HTTP to 127.0.0.1 and block all other connections to internal networks with
"accept 127.0.0.1:80,reject private:*", though that may also allow
connections to your own computer that are addressed to its public (external)
IP address. See RFC 1918 and RFC 3330 for more details about internal and
reserved IP address space.
Tor also allow IPv6 exit policy entries. For instance, "reject6
[FC00::]/7:*" rejects all destinations that share 7 most significant bit
prefix with address FC00::. Respectively, "accept6 [C000::]/3:*"
accepts all destinations that share 3 most significant bit prefix with address
C000::.
This directive can be specified multiple times so you don’t have to put
it all on one line.
Policies are considered first to last, and the first match wins. If you want to
_replace_ the default exit policy, end your exit policy with either a reject
*:* or an accept *:*. Otherwise, you’re _augmenting_ (prepending to)
the default exit policy. The default exit policy is:
ExitPolicyRejectPrivate 0|1
reject *:25 reject *:119 reject *:135-139 reject *:445 reject *:563 reject *:1214 reject *:4661-4666 reject *:6346-6429 reject *:6699 reject *:6881-6999 accept *:*
Reject all private (local) networks, along with your own
public IP address, at the beginning of your exit policy. See above entry on
ExitPolicy. (Default: 1)
IPv6Exit 0|1
If set, and we are an exit node, allow clients to use us
for IPv6 traffic. (Default: 0)
MaxOnionQueueDelay NUM [msec|second]
If we have more onionskins queued for processing than we
can process in this amount of time, reject new ones. (Default: 1750
msec)
MyFamily node,node,...
Declare that this Tor server is controlled or
administered by a group or organization identical or similar to that of the
other servers, defined by their identity fingerprints or nicknames. When two
servers both declare that they are in the same 'family', Tor clients will not
use them in the same circuit. (Each server only needs to list the other
servers in its family; it doesn’t need to list itself, but it
won’t hurt.) Do not list any bridge relay as it would compromise its
concealment.
When listing a node, it’s better to list it by fingerprint than by
nickname: fingerprints are more reliable.
Nickname name
Set the server’s nickname to 'name'. Nicknames
must be between 1 and 19 characters inclusive, and must contain only the
characters [a-zA-Z0-9].
NumCPUs num
How many processes to use at once for decrypting
onionskins and other parallelizable operations. If this is set to 0, Tor will
try to detect how many CPUs you have, defaulting to 1 if it can’t tell.
(Default: 0)
ORPort [address:]PORT|auto [flags]
Advertise this port to listen for connections from Tor
clients and servers. This option is required to be a Tor server. Set it to
"auto" to have Tor pick a port for you. Set it to 0 to not run an
ORPort at all. This option can occur more than once. (Default: 0)
ORListenAddress IP[:PORT]
Tor recognizes these flags on each ORPort: **NoAdvertise**:: By default, we bind to a port and tell our users about it. If NoAdvertise is specified, we don't advertise, but listen anyway. This can be useful if the port everybody will be connecting to (for example, one that's opened on our firewall) is somewhere else. **NoListen**:: By default, we bind to a port and tell our users about it. If NoListen is specified, we don't bind, but advertise anyway. This can be useful if something else (for example, a firewall's port forwarding configuration) is causing connections to reach us. **IPv4Only**:: If the address is absent, or resolves to both an IPv4 and an IPv6 address, only listen to the IPv4 address. **IPv6Only**:: If the address is absent, or resolves to both an IPv4 and an IPv6 address, only listen to the IPv6 address.
For obvious reasons, NoAdvertise and NoListen are mutually exclusive, and IPv4Only and IPv6Only are mutually exclusive.
Bind to this IP address to listen for connections from
Tor clients and servers. If you specify a port, bind to this port rather than
the one specified in ORPort. (Default: 0.0.0.0) This directive can be
specified multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports.
PortForwarding 0|1
This option is deprecated; you can get the same behavior with ORPort now that it supports NoAdvertise and explicit addresses.
Attempt to automatically forward the DirPort and ORPort
on a NAT router connecting this Tor server to the Internet. If set, Tor will
try both NAT-PMP (common on Apple routers) and UPnP (common on routers from
other manufacturers). (Default: 0)
PortForwardingHelper filename|pathname
If PortForwarding is set, use this executable to
configure the forwarding. If set to a filename, the system path will be
searched for the executable. If set to a path, only the specified path will be
executed. (Default: tor-fw-helper)
PublishServerDescriptor
0|1|v3|bridge,...
This option specifies which descriptors Tor will publish
when acting as a relay. You can choose multiple arguments, separated by
commas.
If this option is set to 0, Tor will not publish its descriptors to any
directories. (This is useful if you’re testing out your server, or if
you’re using a Tor controller that handles directory publishing for
you.) Otherwise, Tor will publish its descriptors of all type(s) specified.
The default is "1", which means "if running as a server,
publish the appropriate descriptors to the authorities".
ShutdownWaitLength NUM
When we get a SIGINT and we’re a server, we begin
shutting down: we close listeners and start refusing new circuits. After
NUM seconds, we exit. If we get a second SIGINT, we exit immediately.
(Default: 30 seconds)
SSLKeyLifetime N
minutes|hours|days|weeks
When creating a link certificate for our outermost SSL
handshake, set its lifetime to this amount of time. If set to 0, Tor will
choose some reasonable random defaults. (Default: 0)
HeartbeatPeriod N
minutes|hours|days|weeks
Log a heartbeat message every HeartbeatPeriod
seconds. This is a log level notice message, designed to let you know
your Tor server is still alive and doing useful things. Settings this to 0
will disable the heartbeat. (Default: 6 hours)
AccountingMax N
bytes|KBytes|MBytes|GBytes|
KBits|MBits| GBits|TBytes
Never send more than the specified number of bytes in a
given accounting period, or receive more than that number in the period. For
example, with AccountingMax set to 1 GByte, a server could send 900 MBytes and
receive 800 MBytes and continue running. It will only hibernate once one of
the two reaches 1 GByte. When the number of bytes gets low, Tor will stop
accepting new connections and circuits. When the number of bytes is exhausted,
Tor will hibernate until some time in the next accounting period. To prevent
all servers from waking at the same time, Tor will also wait until a random
point in each period before waking up. If you have bandwidth cost issues,
enabling hibernation is preferable to setting a low bandwidth, since it
provides users with a collection of fast servers that are up some of the time,
which is more useful than a set of slow servers that are always
"available".
AccountingStart day|week|month [day]
HH:MM
Specify how long accounting periods last. If month
is given, each accounting period runs from the time HH:MM on the
dayth day of one month to the same day and time of the next. (The day
must be between 1 and 28.) If week is given, each accounting period
runs from the time HH:MM of the dayth day of one week to the
same day and time of the next week, with Monday as day 1 and Sunday as day 7.
If day is given, each accounting period runs from the time HH:MM
each day to the same time on the next day. All times are local, and given in
24-hour time. (Default: "month 1 0:00")
RefuseUnknownExits 0|1|auto
Prevent nodes that don’t appear in the consensus
from exiting using this relay. If the option is 1, we always block exit
attempts from such nodes; if it’s 0, we never do, and if the option is
"auto", then we do whatever the authorities suggest in the consensus
(and block if the consensus is quiet on the issue). (Default: auto)
ServerDNSResolvConfFile filename
Overrides the default DNS configuration with the
configuration in filename. The file format is the same as the standard
Unix " resolv.conf" file (7). This option, like all other
ServerDNS options, only affects name lookups that your server does on behalf
of clients. (Defaults to use the system DNS configuration.)
ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig 0|1
If this option is false, Tor exits immediately if there
are problems parsing the system DNS configuration or connecting to
nameservers. Otherwise, Tor continues to periodically retry the system
nameservers until it eventually succeeds. (Default: 1)
ServerDNSSearchDomains 0|1
If set to 1, then we will search for addresses in the
local search domain. For example, if this system is configured to believe it
is in "example.com", and a client tries to connect to
"www", the client will be connected to "www.example.com".
This option only affects name lookups that your server does on behalf of
clients. (Default: 0)
ServerDNSDetectHijacking 0|1
When this option is set to 1, we will test periodically
to determine whether our local nameservers have been configured to hijack
failing DNS requests (usually to an advertising site). If they are, we will
attempt to correct this. This option only affects name lookups that your
server does on behalf of clients. (Default: 1)
ServerDNSTestAddresses address,address,...
When we’re detecting DNS hijacking, make sure that
these valid addresses aren’t getting redirected. If they are,
then our DNS is completely useless, and we’ll reset our exit policy to
"reject :". This option only affects name lookups that your
server does on behalf of clients. (Default: "www.google.com, www.mit.edu,
www.yahoo.com, www.slashdot.org")
ServerDNSAllowNonRFC953Hostnames 0|1
When this option is disabled, Tor does not try to resolve
hostnames containing illegal characters (like @ and :) rather than sending
them to an exit node to be resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to
resolve URLs and so on. This option only affects name lookups that your server
does on behalf of clients. (Default: 0)
BridgeRecordUsageByCountry 0|1
When this option is enabled and BridgeRelay is also
enabled, and we have GeoIP data, Tor keeps a per-country count of how many
client addresses have contacted it so that it can help the bridge authority
guess which countries have blocked access to it. (Default: 1)
ServerDNSRandomizeCase 0|1
When this option is set, Tor sets the case of each
character randomly in outgoing DNS requests, and makes sure that the case
matches in DNS replies. This so-called "0x20 hack" helps resist some
types of DNS poisoning attack. For more information, see "Increased DNS
Forgery Resistance through 0x20-Bit Encoding". This option only affects
name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients. (Default: 1)
GeoIPFile filename
A filename containing IPv4 GeoIP data, for use with
by-country statistics.
GeoIPv6File filename
A filename containing IPv6 GeoIP data, for use with
by-country statistics.
TLSECGroup P224|P256
What EC group should we try to use for incoming TLS
connections? P224 is faster, but makes us stand out more. Has no effect if
we’re a client, or if our OpenSSL version lacks support for ECDHE.
(Default: P256)
CellStatistics 0|1
When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the
mean time that cells spend in circuit queues to disk every 24 hours. (Default:
0)
DirReqStatistics 0|1
When this option is enabled, a Tor directory writes
statistics on the number and response time of network status requests to disk
every 24 hours. (Default: 1)
EntryStatistics 0|1
When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the
number of directly connecting clients to disk every 24 hours. (Default:
0)
ExitPortStatistics 0|1
When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the
number of relayed bytes and opened stream per exit port to disk every 24
hours. (Default: 0)
ConnDirectionStatistics 0|1
When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the
bidirectional use of connections to disk every 24 hours. (Default: 0)
ExtraInfoStatistics 0|1
When this option is enabled, Tor includes previously
gathered statistics in its extra-info documents that it uploads to the
directory authorities. (Default: 1)
ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses 0|1
When this option is enabled, Tor routers allow EXTEND
request to localhost, RFC1918 addresses, and so on. This can create security
issues; you should probably leave it off. (Default: 0)
MaxMemInQueues N bytes|KB|MB|GB
This option configures a threshold above which Tor will
assume that it needs to stop queueing or buffering data because it’s
about to run out of memory. If it hits this threshold, it will begin killing
circuits until it has recovered at least 10% of this memory. Do not set this
option too low, or your relay may be unreliable under load. This option only
affects some queues, so the actual process size will be larger than this. If
this option is set to 0, Tor will try to pick a reasonable default based on
your system’s physical memory. (Default: 0)
DIRECTORY SERVER OPTIONS¶
The following options are useful only for directory servers (that is, if DirPort is non-zero): DirPortFrontPage FILENAMEWhen this option is set, it takes an HTML file and
publishes it as "/" on the DirPort. Now relay operators can provide
a disclaimer without needing to set up a separate webserver. There’s a
sample disclaimer in contrib/operator-tools/tor-exit-notice.html.
HidServDirectoryV2 0|1
When this option is set, Tor accepts and serves v2 hidden
service descriptors. Setting DirPort is not required for this, because clients
connect via the ORPort by default. (Default: 1)
DirPort [address:]PORT|auto [flags]
If this option is nonzero, advertise the directory
service on this port. Set it to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for
you. This option can occur more than once, but only one advertised DirPort is
supported: all but one DirPort must have the NoAdvertise flag set.
(Default: 0)
DirListenAddress IP[:PORT]
The same flags are supported here as are supported by ORPort.
Bind the directory service to this address. If you
specify a port, bind to this port rather than the one specified in DirPort.
(Default: 0.0.0.0) This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to
multiple addresses/ports.
DirPolicy policy,policy,...
This option is deprecated; you can get the same behavior with DirPort now that it supports NoAdvertise and explicit addresses.
Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can
connect to the directory ports. The policies have the same form as exit
policies above, except that port specifiers are ignored. Any address not
matched by some entry in the policy is accepted.
DIRECTORY AUTHORITY SERVER OPTIONS¶
The following options enable operation as a directory authority, and control how Tor behaves as a directory authority. You should not need to adjust any of them if you’re running a regular relay or exit server on the public Tor network. AuthoritativeDirectory 0|1When this option is set to 1, Tor operates as an
authoritative directory server. Instead of caching the directory, it generates
its own list of good servers, signs it, and sends that to the clients. Unless
the clients already have you listed as a trusted directory, you probably do
not want to set this option. Please coordinate with the other admins at
tor-ops@torproject.org if you think you should be a directory.
V3AuthoritativeDirectory 0|1
When this option is set in addition to
AuthoritativeDirectory, Tor generates version 3 network statuses and
serves descriptors, etc as described in doc/spec/dir-spec.txt (for Tor clients
and servers running at least 0.2.0.x).
VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory 0|1
When this option is set to 1, Tor adds information on
which versions of Tor are still believed safe for use to the published
directory. Each version 1 authority is automatically a versioning authority;
version 2 authorities provide this service optionally. See
RecommendedVersions, RecommendedClientVersions, and
RecommendedServerVersions.
NamingAuthoritativeDirectory 0|1
When this option is set to 1, then the server advertises
that it has opinions about nickname-to-fingerprint bindings. It will include
these opinions in its published network-status pages, by listing servers with
the flag "Named" if a correct binding between that nickname and
fingerprint has been registered with the dirserver. Naming dirservers will
refuse to accept or publish descriptors that contradict a registered binding.
See approved-routers in the FILES section below.
RecommendedVersions STRING
STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions
currently believed to be safe. The list is included in each directory, and
nodes which pull down the directory learn whether they need to upgrade. This
option can appear multiple times: the values from multiple lines are spliced
together. When this is set then VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory should
be set too.
RecommendedClientVersions STRING
STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions
currently believed to be safe for clients to use. This information is included
in version 2 directories. If this is not set then the value of
RecommendedVersions is used. When this is set then
VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory should be set too.
BridgeAuthoritativeDir 0|1
When this option is set in addition to
AuthoritativeDirectory, Tor accepts and serves router descriptors, but
it caches and serves the main networkstatus documents rather than generating
its own. (Default: 0)
MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2 N
seconds|minutes|hours| days|weeks
Minimum uptime of a v2 hidden service directory to be
accepted as such by authoritative directories. (Default: 25 hours)
RecommendedServerVersions STRING
STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions
currently believed to be safe for servers to use. This information is included
in version 2 directories. If this is not set then the value of
RecommendedVersions is used. When this is set then
VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory should be set too.
ConsensusParams STRING
STRING is a space-separated list of key=value pairs that
Tor will include in the "params" line of its networkstatus
vote.
DirAllowPrivateAddresses 0|1
If set to 1, Tor will accept router descriptors with
arbitrary "Address" elements. Otherwise, if the address is not an IP
address or is a private IP address, it will reject the router descriptor.
(Default: 0)
AuthDirBadDir AddressPattern...
Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns
for servers that will be listed as bad directories in any network status
document this authority publishes, if AuthDirListBadDirs is set.
(The address pattern syntax here and in the options below is the same as for
exit policies, except that you don’t need to say "accept" or
"reject", and ports are not needed.)
AuthDirBadExit AddressPattern...
Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns
for servers that will be listed as bad exits in any network status document
this authority publishes, if AuthDirListBadExits is set.
AuthDirInvalid AddressPattern...
Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns
for servers that will never be listed as "valid" in any network
status document that this authority publishes.
AuthDirReject AddressPattern...
Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns
for servers that will never be listed at all in any network status document
that this authority publishes, or accepted as an OR address in any descriptor
submitted for publication by this authority.
AuthDirBadDirCCs CC,...
AuthDirBadExitCCs CC,...
AuthDirInvalidCCs CC,...
AuthDirRejectCCs CC,...
Authoritative directories only. These options contain a
comma-separated list of country codes such that any server in one of those
country codes will be marked as a bad directory/bad exit/invalid for use, or
rejected entirely.
AuthDirListBadDirs 0|1
Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, this
directory has some opinion about which nodes are unsuitable as directory
caches. (Do not set this to 1 unless you plan to list non-functioning
directories as bad; otherwise, you are effectively voting in favor of every
declared directory.)
AuthDirListBadExits 0|1
Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, this
directory has some opinion about which nodes are unsuitable as exit nodes. (Do
not set this to 1 unless you plan to list non-functioning exits as bad;
otherwise, you are effectively voting in favor of every declared exit as an
exit.)
AuthDirRejectUnlisted 0|1
Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, the
directory server rejects all uploaded server descriptors that aren’t
explicitly listed in the fingerprints file. This acts as a "panic
button" if we get hit with a Sybil attack. (Default: 0)
AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr NUM
Authoritative directories only. The maximum number of
servers that we will list as acceptable on a single IP address. Set this to
"0" for "no limit". (Default: 2)
AuthDirMaxServersPerAuthAddr NUM
Authoritative directories only. Like
AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr, but applies to addresses shared with directory
authorities. (Default: 5)
AuthDirFastGuarantee N
bytes|KBytes|MBytes|GBytes|KBits|MBits|GBits
Authoritative directories only. If non-zero, always vote
the Fast flag for any relay advertising this amount of capacity or more.
(Default: 100 KBytes)
AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee N
bytes|KBytes|MBytes|
GBytes|KBits|MBits| GBits
Authoritative directories only. If non-zero, this
advertised capacity or more is always sufficient to satisfy the bandwidth
requirement for the Guard flag. (Default: 250 KBytes)
BridgePassword Password
If set, contains an HTTP authenticator that tells a
bridge authority to serve all requested bridge information. Used by the (only
partially implemented) "bridge community" design, where a community
of bridge relay operators all use an alternate bridge directory authority, and
their target user audience can periodically fetch the list of available
community bridges to stay up-to-date. (Default: not set)
V3AuthVotingInterval N minutes|hours
V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the
server’s preferred voting interval. Note that voting will
actually happen at an interval chosen by consensus from all the
authorities' preferred intervals. This time SHOULD divide evenly into a day.
(Default: 1 hour)
V3AuthVoteDelay N minutes|hours
V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the
server’s preferred delay between publishing its vote and assuming it
has all the votes from all the other authorities. Note that the actual time
used is not the server’s preferred time, but the consensus of all
preferences. (Default: 5 minutes)
V3AuthDistDelay N minutes|hours
V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the
server’s preferred delay between publishing its consensus and signature
and assuming it has all the signatures from all the other authorities. Note
that the actual time used is not the server’s preferred time, but the
consensus of all preferences. (Default: 5 minutes)
V3AuthNIntervalsValid NUM
V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the number
of VotingIntervals for which each consensus should be valid for. Choosing high
numbers increases network partitioning risks; choosing low numbers increases
directory traffic. Note that the actual number of intervals used is not the
server’s preferred number, but the consensus of all preferences. Must
be at least 2. (Default: 3)
V3BandwidthsFile FILENAME
V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the
location of the bandwidth-authority generated file storing information on
relays' measured bandwidth capacities. (Default: unset)
V3AuthUseLegacyKey 0|1
If set, the directory authority will sign consensuses not
only with its own signing key, but also with a "legacy" key and
certificate with a different identity. This feature is used to migrate
directory authority keys in the event of a compromise. (Default: 0)
RephistTrackTime N
seconds|minutes|hours|days| weeks
Tells an authority, or other node tracking node
reliability and history, that fine-grained information about nodes can be
discarded when it hasn’t changed for a given amount of time. (Default:
24 hours)
VoteOnHidServDirectoriesV2 0|1
When this option is set in addition to
AuthoritativeDirectory, Tor votes on whether to accept relays as hidden
service directories. (Default: 1)
AuthDirHasIPv6Connectivity 0|1
Authoritative directories only. When set to 0, OR ports
with an IPv6 address are being accepted without reachability testing. When set
to 1, IPv6 OR ports are being tested just like IPv4 OR ports. (Default:
0)
MinMeasuredBWsForAuthToIgnoreAdvertised N
A total value, in abstract bandwidth units, describing
how much measured total bandwidth an authority should have observed on the
network before it will treat advertised bandwidths as wholly unreliable.
(Default: 500)
HIDDEN SERVICE OPTIONS¶
The following options are used to configure a hidden service. HiddenServiceDir DIRECTORYStore data files for a hidden service in DIRECTORY. Every
hidden service must have a separate directory. You may use this option
multiple times to specify multiple services. DIRECTORY must be an existing
directory.
HiddenServicePort VIRTPORT [TARGET]
Configure a virtual port VIRTPORT for a hidden service.
You may use this option multiple times; each time applies to the service using
the most recent hiddenservicedir. By default, this option maps the virtual
port to the same port on 127.0.0.1 over TCP. You may override the target port,
address, or both by specifying a target of addr, port, or addr:port. You may
also have multiple lines with the same VIRTPORT: when a user connects to that
VIRTPORT, one of the TARGETs from those lines will be chosen at random.
PublishHidServDescriptors 0|1
If set to 0, Tor will run any hidden services you
configure, but it won’t advertise them to the rendezvous directory.
This option is only useful if you’re using a Tor controller that
handles hidserv publishing for you. (Default: 1)
HiddenServiceVersion version,version,...
A list of rendezvous service descriptor versions to
publish for the hidden service. Currently, only version 2 is supported.
(Default: 2)
HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient auth-type
client-name,client-name, ...
If configured, the hidden service is accessible for
authorized clients only. The auth-type can either be 'basic' for a
general-purpose authorization protocol or 'stealth' for a less scalable
protocol that also hides service activity from unauthorized clients. Only
clients that are listed here are authorized to access the hidden service.
Valid client names are 1 to 16 characters long and only use characters in
A-Za-z0-9+-_ (no spaces). If this option is set, the hidden service is not
accessible for clients without authorization any more. Generated authorization
data can be found in the hostname file. Clients need to put this authorization
data in their configuration file using HidServAuth.
RendPostPeriod N
seconds|minutes|hours|days| weeks
Every time the specified period elapses, Tor uploads any
rendezvous service descriptors to the directory servers. This information is
also uploaded whenever it changes. (Default: 1 hour)
TESTING NETWORK OPTIONS¶
The following options are used for running a testing Tor network. TestingTorNetwork 0|1If set to 1, Tor adjusts default values of the
configuration options below, so that it is easier to set up a testing Tor
network. May only be set if non-default set of DirAuthorities is set. Cannot
be unset while Tor is running. (Default: 0)
TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval N minutes|hours
ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig 1 DirAllowPrivateAddresses 1 EnforceDistinctSubnets 0 AssumeReachable 1 AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr 0 AuthDirMaxServersPerAuthAddr 0 ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses 0 ClientRejectInternalAddresses 0 CountPrivateBandwidth 1 ExitPolicyRejectPrivate 0 ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses 1 V3AuthVotingInterval 5 minutes V3AuthVoteDelay 20 seconds V3AuthDistDelay 20 seconds MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2 0 seconds TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval 5 minutes TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay 20 seconds TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay 20 seconds TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability 0 minutes TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime 0 minutes TestingServerDownloadSchedule 0, 0, 0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 30, 60 TestingClientDownloadSchedule 0, 0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 30, 60 TestingServerConsensusDownloadSchedule 0, 0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 30, 60 TestingClientConsensusDownloadSchedule 0, 0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 30, 60 TestingBridgeDownloadSchedule 60, 30, 30, 60 TestingClientMaxIntervalWithoutRequest 5 seconds TestingDirConnectionMaxStall 30 seconds TestingConsensusMaxDownloadTries 80 TestingDescriptorMaxDownloadTries 80 TestingMicrodescMaxDownloadTries 80 TestingCertMaxDownloadTries 80 TestingEnableConnBwEvent 1 TestingEnableCellStatsEvent 1 TestingEnableTbEmptyEvent 1
Like V3AuthVotingInterval, but for initial voting
interval before the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires
that TestingTorNetwork is set. (Default: 30 minutes)
TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay N minutes|hours
Like V3AuthVoteDelay, but for initial voting interval
before the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that
TestingTorNetwork is set. (Default: 5 minutes)
TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay N minutes|hours
Like V3AuthDistDelay, but for initial voting interval
before the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that
TestingTorNetwork is set. (Default: 5 minutes)
TestingV3AuthVotingStartOffset N
seconds|minutes|hours
Directory authorities offset voting start time by this
much. Changing this requires that TestingTorNetwork is set. (Default:
0)
TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability N
minutes|hours
After starting as an authority, do not make claims about
whether routers are Running until this much time has passed. Changing this
requires that TestingTorNetwork is set. (Default: 30 minutes)
TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime N
minutes|hours
Clients try downloading router descriptors from directory
caches after this time. Changing this requires that TestingTorNetwork
is set. (Default: 10 minutes)
TestingMinFastFlagThreshold N
bytes|KBytes|MBytes|
GBytes|KBits|MBits| GBits
Minimum value for the Fast flag. Overrides the ordinary
minimum taken from the consensus when TestingTorNetwork is set. (Default:
0.)
TestingServerDownloadSchedule N,N,...
Schedule for when servers should download things in
general. Changing this requires that TestingTorNetwork is set.
(Default: 0, 0, 0, 60, 60, 120, 300, 900, 2147483647)
TestingClientDownloadSchedule N,N,...
Schedule for when clients should download things in
general. Changing this requires that TestingTorNetwork is set.
(Default: 0, 0, 60, 300, 600, 2147483647)
TestingServerConsensusDownloadSchedule N,N,...
Schedule for when servers should download consensuses.
Changing this requires that TestingTorNetwork is set. (Default: 0, 0,
60, 300, 600, 1800, 1800, 1800, 1800, 1800, 3600, 7200)
TestingClientConsensusDownloadSchedule N,N,...
Schedule for when clients should download consensuses.
Changing this requires that TestingTorNetwork is set. (Default: 0, 0,
60, 300, 600, 1800, 3600, 3600, 3600, 10800, 21600, 43200)
TestingBridgeDownloadSchedule N,N,...
Schedule for when clients should download bridge
descriptors. Changing this requires that TestingTorNetwork is set.
(Default: 3600, 900, 900, 3600)
TestingClientMaxIntervalWithoutRequest N
seconds|minutes
When directory clients have only a few descriptors to
request, they batch them until they have more, or until this amount of time
has passed. Changing this requires that TestingTorNetwork is set.
(Default: 10 minutes)
TestingDirConnectionMaxStall N seconds|minutes
Let a directory connection stall this long before
expiring it. Changing this requires that TestingTorNetwork is set.
(Default: 5 minutes)
TestingConsensusMaxDownloadTries NUM
Try this often to download a consensus before giving up.
Changing this requires that TestingTorNetwork is set. (Default:
8)
TestingDescriptorMaxDownloadTries NUM
Try this often to download a router descriptor before
giving up. Changing this requires that TestingTorNetwork is set.
(Default: 8)
TestingMicrodescMaxDownloadTries NUM
Try this often to download a microdesc descriptor before
giving up. Changing this requires that TestingTorNetwork is set.
(Default: 8)
TestingCertMaxDownloadTries NUM
Try this often to download a v3 authority certificate
before giving up. Changing this requires that TestingTorNetwork is set.
(Default: 8)
TestingDirAuthVoteGuard node,node,...
A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes
and address patterns of nodes to vote Guard for regardless of their uptime and
bandwidth. See the ExcludeNodes option for more information on how to
specify nodes.
In order for this option to have any effect, TestingTorNetwork has to be
set.
TestingEnableConnBwEvent 0|1
If this option is set, then Tor controllers may register
for CONN_BW events. Changing this requires that TestingTorNetwork is
set. (Default: 0)
TestingEnableCellStatsEvent 0|1
If this option is set, then Tor controllers may register
for CELL_STATS events. Changing this requires that TestingTorNetwork is
set. (Default: 0)
TestingEnableTbEmptyEvent 0|1
If this option is set, then Tor controllers may register
for TB_EMPTY events. Changing this requires that TestingTorNetwork is
set. (Default: 0)
TestingMinExitFlagThreshold N
KBytes|MBytes|GBytes|
KBits|MBits|GBits
Sets a lower-bound for assigning an exit flag when
running as an authority on a testing network. Overrides the usual default
lower bound of 4 KB. (Default: 0)
SIGNALS¶
Tor catches the following signals: SIGTERMTor will catch this, clean up and sync to disk if
necessary, and exit.
SIGINT
Tor clients behave as with SIGTERM; but Tor servers will
do a controlled slow shutdown, closing listeners and waiting 30 seconds before
exiting. (The delay can be configured with the ShutdownWaitLength config
option.)
SIGHUP
The signal instructs Tor to reload its configuration
(including closing and reopening logs), and kill and restart its helper
processes if applicable.
SIGUSR1
Log statistics about current connections, past
connections, and throughput.
SIGUSR2
Switch all logs to loglevel debug. You can go back to the
old loglevels by sending a SIGHUP.
SIGCHLD
Tor receives this signal when one of its helper processes
has exited, so it can clean up.
SIGPIPE
Tor catches this signal and ignores it.
SIGXFSZ
If this signal exists on your platform, Tor catches and
ignores it.
FILES¶
/etc/tor/torrcThe configuration file, which contains "option
value" pairs.
$HOME/.torrc
Fallback location for torrc, if /etc/tor/torrc is not
found.
/var/lib/tor/
The tor process stores keys and other data here.
DataDirectory/cached-status/
The most recently downloaded network status document for
each authority. Each file holds one such document; the filenames are the
hexadecimal identity key fingerprints of the directory authorities. Mostly
obsolete.
DataDirectory/cached-certs
This file holds downloaded directory key certificates
that are used to verify authenticity of documents generated by Tor directory
authorities.
DataDirectory/cached-consensus and/or
cached-microdesc-consensus
The most recent consensus network status document
we’ve downloaded.
DataDirectory/cached-descriptors and cached-descriptors.new
These files hold downloaded router statuses. Some routers
may appear more than once; if so, the most recently published descriptor is
used. Lines beginning with @-signs are annotations that contain more
information about a given router. The ".new" file is an append-only
journal; when it gets too large, all entries are merged into a new
cached-descriptors file.
DataDirectory/cached-microdescs and cached-microdescs.new
These files hold downloaded microdescriptors. Lines
beginning with @-signs are annotations that contain more information about a
given router. The ".new" file is an append-only journal; when it
gets too large, all entries are merged into a new cached-microdescs
file.
DataDirectory/cached-routers and cached-routers.new
Obsolete versions of cached-descriptors and
cached-descriptors.new. When Tor can’t find the newer files, it looks
here instead.
DataDirectory/state
A set of persistent key-value mappings. These are
documented in the file. These include:
DataDirectory/bw_accounting
•The current entry guards and their status.
•The current bandwidth accounting values (unused
so far; see below).
•When the file was last written
•What version of Tor generated the state
file
•A short history of bandwidth usage, as produced
in the router descriptors.
Used to track bandwidth accounting values (when the
current period starts and ends; how much has been read and written so far this
period). This file is obsolete, and the data is now stored in the 'state' file
as well. Only used when bandwidth accounting is enabled.
DataDirectory/control_auth_cookie
Used for cookie authentication with the controller.
Location can be overridden by the CookieAuthFile config option. Regenerated on
startup. See control-spec.txt for details. Only used when cookie
authentication is enabled.
DataDirectory/lock
This file is used to prevent two Tor instances from using
same data directory. If access to this file is locked, data directory is
already in use by Tor.
DataDirectory/keys/*
Only used by servers. Holds identity keys and onion
keys.
DataDirectory/fingerprint
Only used by servers. Holds the fingerprint of the
server’s identity key.
DataDirectory/hashed-fingerprint
Only used by bridges. Holds the hashed fingerprint of the
bridge’s identity key. (That is, the hash of the hash of the identity
key.)
DataDirectory/approved-routers
Only for naming authoritative directory servers (see
NamingAuthoritativeDirectory). This file lists nickname to identity
bindings. Each line lists a nickname and a fingerprint separated by
whitespace. See your fingerprint file in the DataDirectory for
an example line. If the nickname is !reject then descriptors from the
given identity (fingerprint) are rejected by this server. If it is
!invalid then descriptors are accepted but marked in the directory as
not valid, that is, not recommended.
DataDirectory/v3-status-votes
Only for authoritative directory servers. This file
contains status votes from all the authoritative directory servers and is used
to generate the network consensus document.
DataDirectory/unverified-consensus
This file contains a network consensus document that has
been downloaded, but which we didn’t have the right certificates to
check yet.
DataDirectory/unverified-microdesc-consensus
This file contains a microdescriptor-flavored network
consensus document that has been downloaded, but which we didn’t have
the right certificates to check yet.
DataDirectory/unparseable-desc
Onion router descriptors that Tor was unable to parse are
dumped to this file. Only used for debugging.
DataDirectory/router-stability
Only used by authoritative directory servers. Tracks
measurements for router mean-time-between-failures so that authorities have a
good idea of how to set their Stable flags.
DataDirectory/stats/dirreq-stats
Only used by directory caches and authorities. This file
is used to collect directory request statistics.
DataDirectory/stats/entry-stats
Only used by servers. This file is used to collect
incoming connection statistics by Tor entry nodes.
DataDirectory/stats/bridge-stats
Only used by servers. This file is used to collect
incoming connection statistics by Tor bridges.
DataDirectory/stats/exit-stats
Only used by servers. This file is used to collect
outgoing connection statistics by Tor exit routers.
DataDirectory/stats/buffer-stats
Only used by servers. This file is used to collect buffer
usage history.
DataDirectory/stats/conn-stats
Only used by servers. This file is used to collect
approximate connection history (number of active connections over time).
HiddenServiceDirectory/hostname
The <base32-encoded-fingerprint>.onion domain name
for this hidden service. If the hidden service is restricted to authorized
clients only, this file also contains authorization data for all
clients.
HiddenServiceDirectory/private_key
The private key for this hidden service.
HiddenServiceDirectory/client_keys
Authorization data for a hidden service that is only
accessible by authorized clients.
SEE ALSO¶
torsocks(1), torify(1) https://www.torproject.org/BUGS¶
Plenty, probably. Tor is still in development. Please report them.AUTHORS¶
Roger Dingledine [arma at mit.edu], Nick Mathewson [nickm at alum.mit.edu].12/02/2017 | Tor |