## table of contents

RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT(3SSL) | OpenSSL | RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT(3SSL) |

# NAME¶

RSA_public_encrypt, RSA_private_decrypt - RSA public key cryptography# SYNOPSIS¶

#include <openssl/rsa.h> int RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); int RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);

# DESCRIPTION¶

**RSA_public_encrypt()**encrypts the

**flen**bytes at

**from**(usually a session key) using the public key

**rsa**and stores the ciphertext in

**to**.

**to**must point to RSA_size(

**rsa**) bytes of memory.

**padding** denotes one of the following modes:

- RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
- PKCS #1 v1.5 padding. This currently is the most widely used mode. However, it is highly recommended to use RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING in new applications. SEE WARNING BELOW.
- RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING
- EME-OAEP as defined in PKCS #1 v2.0 with SHA-1, MGF1 and an empty encoding parameter. This mode is recommended for all new applications.
- RSA_SSLV23_PADDING
- PKCS #1 v1.5 padding with an SSL-specific modification that denotes that the server is SSL3 capable.
- RSA_NO_PADDING
- Raw RSA encryption. This mode should
*only*be used to implement cryptographically sound padding modes in the application code. Encrypting user data directly with RSA is insecure.

**flen** must not be more than RSA_size(**rsa**) - 11 for
the PKCS #1 v1.5 based padding modes, not more than RSA_size(**rsa**) -
42 for RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING and exactly RSA_size(**rsa**) for
RSA_NO_PADDING. When a padding mode other than RSA_NO_PADDING is in use,
then **RSA_public_encrypt()** will include some random bytes into the
ciphertext and therefore the ciphertext will be different each time, even if
the plaintext and the public key are exactly identical. The returned
ciphertext in **to** will always be zero padded to exactly
RSA_size(**rsa**) bytes. **to** and **from** may overlap.

**RSA_private_decrypt()** decrypts the **flen** bytes at
**from** using the private key **rsa** and stores the plaintext in
**to**. **flen** should be equal to RSA_size(**rsa**) but may be
smaller, when leading zero bytes are in the ciphertext. Those are not
important and may be removed, but **RSA_public_encrypt()** does not do
that. **to** must point to a memory section large enough to hold the
maximal possible decrypted data (which is equal to RSA_size(**rsa**) for
RSA_NO_PADDING, RSA_size(**rsa**) - 11 for the PKCS #1 v1.5 based padding
modes and RSA_size(**rsa**) - 42 for RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING).
**padding** is the padding mode that was used to encrypt the data.
**to** and **from** may overlap.

# RETURN VALUES¶

**RSA_public_encrypt()**returns the size of the encrypted data (i.e., RSA_size(

**rsa**)).

**RSA_private_decrypt()**returns the size of the recovered plaintext. A return value of 0 is not an error and means only that the plaintext was empty.

On error, -1 is returned; the error codes can be obtained by ERR_get_error(3).

# WARNING¶

Decryption failures in the RSA_PKCS1_PADDING mode leak information which can potentially be used to mount a Bleichenbacher padding oracle attack. This is an inherent weakness in the PKCS #1 v1.5 padding design. Prefer RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING.# CONFORMING TO¶

SSL, PKCS #1 v2.0# SEE ALSO¶

ERR_get_error(3), RAND_bytes(3), RSA_size(3)# COPYRIGHT¶

Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at <https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.

2019-05-30 | 1.1.1c |