NAME¶resolved.conf, resolved.conf.d - Network Name Resolution configuration files
DESCRIPTION¶These configuration files control local DNS and LLMNR name resolution.
CONFIGURATION DIRECTORIES AND PRECEDENCE¶The default configuration is defined during compilation, so a configuration file is only needed when it is necessary to deviate from those defaults. By default, the configuration file in /etc/systemd/ contains commented out entries showing the defaults as a guide to the administrator. This file can be edited to create local overrides.
When packages need to customize the configuration, they can install configuration snippets in /usr/lib/systemd/*.conf.d/ or /usr/local/lib/systemd/*.conf.d/. Files in /etc/ are reserved for the local administrator, who may use this logic to override the configuration files installed by vendor packages. The main configuration file is read before any of the configuration directories, and has the lowest precedence; entries in a file in any configuration directory override entries in the single configuration file. Files in the *.conf.d/ configuration subdirectories are sorted by their filename in lexicographic order, regardless of which of the subdirectories they reside in. When multiple files specify the same option, for options which accept just a single value, the entry in the file with the lexicographically latest name takes precedence. For options which accept a list of values, entries are collected as they occur in files sorted lexicographically. It is recommended to prefix all filenames in those subdirectories with a two-digit number and a dash, to simplify the ordering of the files.
To disable a configuration file supplied by the vendor, the recommended way is to place a symlink to /dev/null in the configuration directory in /etc/, with the same filename as the vendor configuration file.
OPTIONS¶The following options are available in the "[Resolve]" section:
Specified domain names may optionally be prefixed with "~". In this case they do not define a search path, but preferably direct DNS queries for the indicated domains to the DNS servers configured with the system DNS= setting (see above), in case additional, suitable per-link DNS servers are known. If no per-link DNS servers are known using the "~" syntax has no effect. Use the construct "~." (which is composed of "~" to indicate a routing domain and "." to indicate the DNS root domain that is the implied suffix of all DNS domains) to use the system DNS server defined with DNS= preferably for all domains.
Note that DNSSEC validation requires retrieval of additional DNS data, and thus results in a small DNS look-up time penalty.
DNSSEC requires knowledge of "trust anchors" to prove data integrity. The trust anchor for the Internet root domain is built into the resolver, additional trust anchors may be defined with dnssec-trust-anchors.d(5). Trust anchors may change at regular intervals, and old trust anchors may be revoked. In such a case DNSSEC validation is not possible until new trust anchors are configured locally or the resolver software package is updated with the new root trust anchor. In effect, when the built-in trust anchor is revoked and DNSSEC= is true, all further lookups will fail, as it cannot be proved anymore whether lookups are correctly signed, or validly unsigned. If DNSSEC= is set to "allow-downgrade" the resolver will automatically turn off DNSSEC validation in such a case.
Client programs looking up DNS data will be informed whether lookups could be verified using DNSSEC, or whether the returned data could not be verified (either because the data was found unsigned in the DNS, or the DNS server did not support DNSSEC or no appropriate trust anchors were known). In the latter case it is assumed that client programs employ a secondary scheme to validate the returned DNS data, should this be required.
It is recommended to set DNSSEC= to true on systems where it is known that the DNS server supports DNSSEC correctly, and where software or trust anchor updates happen regularly. On other systems it is recommended to set DNSSEC= to "allow-downgrade".
In addition to this global DNSSEC setting systemd-networkd.service(8) also maintains per-link DNSSEC settings. For system DNS servers (see above), only the global DNSSEC setting is in effect. For per-link DNS servers the per-link setting is in effect, unless it is unset in which case the global setting is used instead.
Site-private DNS zones generally conflict with DNSSEC operation, unless a negative (if the private zone is not signed) or positive (if the private zone is signed) trust anchor is configured for them. If "allow-downgrade" mode is selected, it is attempted to detect site-private DNS zones using top-level domains (TLDs) that are not known by the DNS root server. This logic does not work in all private zone setups.
Defaults to "allow-downgrade"
Note that DNS-over-TLS requires additional data to be send for setting up an encrypted connection, and thus results in a small DNS look-up time penalty.
Note as the resolver is not capable of authenticating the server, it is vulnerable for "man-in-the-middle" attacks.
In addition to this global DNSOverTLS setting systemd-networkd.service(8) also maintains per-link DNSOverTLS settings. For system DNS servers (see above), only the global DNSOverTLS setting is in effect. For per-link DNS servers the per-link setting is in effect, unless it is unset in which case the global setting is used instead.
Defaults to off.
If "no-negative", only positive answers are cached.
Note that caching is turned off implicitly if the configured DNS server is on a host-local IP address (such as 127.0.0.1 or ::1), in order to avoid duplicate local caching.
Note that the DNS stub listener is turned off implicitly when its listening address and port are already in use.
SEE ALSO¶systemd(1), systemd-resolved.service(8), systemd-networkd.service(8), dnssec-trust-anchors.d(5), resolv.conf(4)
- RFC 4795
- RFC 6762