From arosta@uclan.ac.uk Wed Oct 03 09:50:16 2001
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Date: Wed, 03 Oct 2001 17:59:10 +0100
To: pycyn , lojban
Subject: Re: [lojban] Set of answers encore
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From: And Rosta
>>> 10/03/01 03:26am >>>
a.rosta@dtn.ntl.com writes:
#> pc:
#> > arosta@uclan.ac.uk writes:=20
#> > "da zo'u There is a proposition p such that p is true just in case d=
a=20
#> is=20
#> > extension of tu'odu'u ce'u klama kei and John believes that p"=20
#> >=20
#> > Well, in one sense it is hard to complain about this, since it covers=
=20
#> > the extension/intension problem nicely. I am now off again worrying=20
#> > about what soert of thing the extension of {tu'o du'u ce'u klama kei}=
=20
#> > is, as a result of a discussion on some other topic.=20
#
#My extreme bad! This turns out to be, on examination, true so long as Joh=
n=20
#has one true belief and one false one, regardless of what the beliefs are=
=20
#about. If da is the extension of whatever then this claim and the true=20
#belief are both true, so the one just in case the other. so there is one t=
rue=20
#just in case the extension-claim is. On the othre hand, if the extension=
=20
#claim is false, then it iff the false belief is true, so something iff the=
=20
#extension claim. But the extension claim is either true or false and on=20
#either option, there is something John believes and that is true iff the=20
#extension claim is. So, the claim holds absolutely. The joys of a logica=
l=20
#language!=20=20=20
I presume then that you no longer consider=20
John believes p such that p is true just in case Tully is a great roman o=
rator
to be unproblematic.
What sort of remedies can you see? My instinct would be to go for
possible worlds (x is a world of which p is true iff x is a world of which =
y is=20
true?), but you're an old hand at this stuff, so I'll wait on your suggesti=
on.
--And.=20