.\" Automatically generated by Pod::Man 4.07 (Pod::Simple 3.32) .\" .\" Standard preamble: .\" ======================================================================== .de Sp \" Vertical space (when we can't use .PP) .if t .sp .5v .if n .sp .. .de Vb \" Begin verbatim text .ft CW .nf .ne \\$1 .. .de Ve \" End verbatim text .ft R .fi .. .\" Set up some character translations and predefined strings. \*(-- will .\" give an unbreakable dash, \*(PI will give pi, \*(L" will give a left .\" double quote, and \*(R" will give a right double quote. \*(C+ will .\" give a nicer C++. Capital omega is used to do unbreakable dashes and .\" therefore won't be available. \*(C` and \*(C' expand to `' in nroff, .\" nothing in troff, for use with C<>. .tr \(*W- .ds C+ C\v'-.1v'\h'-1p'\s-2+\h'-1p'+\s0\v'.1v'\h'-1p' .ie n \{\ . ds -- \(*W- . ds PI pi . if (\n(.H=4u)&(1m=24u) .ds -- \(*W\h'-12u'\(*W\h'-12u'-\" diablo 10 pitch . if (\n(.H=4u)&(1m=20u) .ds -- \(*W\h'-12u'\(*W\h'-8u'-\" diablo 12 pitch . ds L" "" . ds R" "" . ds C` "" . ds C' "" 'br\} .el\{\ . ds -- \|\(em\| . ds PI \(*p . ds L" `` . ds R" '' . ds C` . ds C' 'br\} .\" .\" Escape single quotes in literal strings from groff's Unicode transform. .ie \n(.g .ds Aq \(aq .el .ds Aq ' .\" .\" If the F register is >0, we'll generate index entries on stderr for .\" titles (.TH), headers (.SH), subsections (.SS), items (.Ip), and index .\" entries marked with X<> in POD. Of course, you'll have to process the .\" output yourself in some meaningful fashion. .\" .\" Avoid warning from groff about undefined register 'F'. .de IX .. .if !\nF .nr F 0 .if \nF>0 \{\ . de IX . tm Index:\\$1\t\\n%\t"\\$2" .. . if !\nF==2 \{\ . nr % 0 . nr F 2 . \} .\} .\" ======================================================================== .\" .IX Title "IO::Socket::SSL::Intercept 3pm" .TH IO::Socket::SSL::Intercept 3pm "2017-04-26" "perl v5.24.1" "User Contributed Perl Documentation" .\" For nroff, turn off justification. Always turn off hyphenation; it makes .\" way too many mistakes in technical documents. .if n .ad l .nh .SH "NAME" IO::Socket::SSL::Intercept \-\- SSL interception (man in the middle) .SH "SYNOPSIS" .IX Header "SYNOPSIS" .Vb 10 \& use IO::Socket::SSL::Intercept; \& # create interceptor with proxy certificates \& my $mitm = IO::Socket::SSL::Intercept\->new( \& proxy_cert_file => \*(Aqproxy_cert.pem\*(Aq, \& proxy_key_file => \*(Aqproxy_key.pem\*(Aq, \& ... \& ); \& my $listen = IO::Socket::INET\->new( LocalAddr => .., Listen => .. ); \& while (1) { \& # TCP accept new client \& my $client = $listen\->accept or next; \& # SSL connect to server \& my $server = IO::Socket::SSL\->new( \& PeerAddr => .., \& SSL_verify_mode => ..., \& ... \& ) or die "ssl connect failed: $!,$SSL_ERROR"; \& # clone server certificate \& my ($cert,$key) = $mitm\->clone_cert( $server\->peer_certificate ); \& # and upgrade client side to SSL with cloned certificate \& IO::Socket::SSL\->start_SSL($client, \& SSL_server => 1, \& SSL_cert => $cert, \& SSL_key => $key \& ) or die "upgrade failed: $SSL_ERROR"; \& # now transfer data between $client and $server and analyze \& # the unencrypted data \& ... \& } .Ve .SH "DESCRIPTION" .IX Header "DESCRIPTION" This module provides functionality to clone certificates and sign them with a proxy certificate, thus making it easy to intercept \s-1SSL\s0 connections (man in the middle). It also manages a cache of the generated certificates. .SH "How Intercepting SSL Works" .IX Header "How Intercepting SSL Works" Intercepting \s-1SSL\s0 connections is useful for analyzing encrypted traffic for security reasons or for testing. It does not break the end-to-end security of \&\s-1SSL,\s0 e.g. a properly written client will notice the interception unless you explicitly configure the client to trust your interceptor. Intercepting \s-1SSL\s0 works the following way: .IP "\(bu" 4 Create a new \s-1CA\s0 certificate, which will be used to sign the cloned certificates. This proxy \s-1CA\s0 certificate should be trusted by the client, or (a properly written client) will throw error messages or deny the connections because it detected a man in the middle attack. Due to the way the interception works there no support for client side certificates is possible. .Sp Using openssl such a proxy \s-1CA\s0 certificate and private key can be created with: .Sp .Vb 4 \& openssl genrsa \-out proxy_key.pem 1024 \& openssl req \-new \-x509 \-extensions v3_ca \-key proxy_key.pem \-out proxy_cert.pem \& # export as PKCS12 for import into browser \& openssl pkcs12 \-export \-in proxy_cert.pem \-inkey proxy_key.pem \-out proxy_cert.p12 .Ve .IP "\(bu" 4 Configure client to connect to use intercepting proxy or somehow redirect connections from client to the proxy (e.g. packet filter redirects, \s-1ARP\s0 or \s-1DNS\s0 spoofing etc). .IP "\(bu" 4 Accept the \s-1TCP\s0 connection from the client, e.g. don't do any \s-1SSL\s0 handshakes with the client yet. .IP "\(bu" 4 Establish the \s-1SSL\s0 connection to the server and verify the servers certificate as usually. Then create a new certificate based on the original servers certificate, but signed by your proxy \s-1CA.\s0 This is the step where IO::Socket::SSL::Intercept helps. .IP "\(bu" 4 Upgrade the \s-1TCP\s0 connection to the client to \s-1SSL\s0 using the cloned certificate from the server. If the client trusts your proxy \s-1CA\s0 it will accept the upgrade to \s-1SSL.\s0 .IP "\(bu" 4 Transfer data between client and server. While the connections to client and server are both encrypted with \s-1SSL\s0 you will read/write the unencrypted data in your proxy application. .SH "METHODS" .IX Header "METHODS" IO::Socket::SSL::Intercept helps creating the cloned certificate with the following methods: .IP "\fB\f(CB$mitm\fB = IO::Socket::SSL::Intercept\->new(%args)\fR" 4 .IX Item "$mitm = IO::Socket::SSL::Intercept->new(%args)" This creates a new interceptor object. \f(CW%args\fR should be .RS 4 .IP "proxy_cert X509 | proxy_cert_file filename" 8 .IX Item "proxy_cert X509 | proxy_cert_file filename" This is the proxy certificate. It can be either given by an X509 object from Net::SSLeays internal representation, or using a file in \s-1PEM\s0 format. .IP "proxy_key \s-1EVP_PKEY\s0 | proxy_key_file filename" 8 .IX Item "proxy_key EVP_PKEY | proxy_key_file filename" This is the key for the proxy certificate. It can be either given by an \s-1EVP_PKEY\s0 object from Net::SSLeays internal representation, or using a file in \s-1PEM\s0 format. The key should not have a passphrase. .IP "pubkey \s-1EVP_PKEY\s0 | pubkey_file filename" 8 .IX Item "pubkey EVP_PKEY | pubkey_file filename" This optional argument specifies the public key used for the cloned certificate. It can be either given by an \s-1EVP_PKEY\s0 object from Net::SSLeays internal representation, or using a file in \s-1PEM\s0 format. If not given it will create a new public key on each call of \f(CW\*(C`new\*(C'\fR. .IP "serial \s-1INTEGER\s0" 8 .IX Item "serial INTEGER" This optional argument gives the starting point for the serial numbers of the newly created certificates. Default to 1. .IP "cache \s-1HASH\s0 | \s-1SUBROUTINE\s0" 8 .IX Item "cache HASH | SUBROUTINE" This optional argument gives a way to cache created certificates, so that they don't get recreated on future accesses to the same host. If the argument ist not given an internal \s-1HASH\s0 ist used. .Sp If the argument is a hash it will store for each generated certificate a hash reference with \f(CW\*(C`cert\*(C'\fR and \f(CW\*(C`atime\*(C'\fR in the hash, where \f(CW\*(C`atime\*(C'\fR is the time of last access (to expire unused entries) and \f(CW\*(C`cert\*(C'\fR is the certificate. Please note, that the certificate is in Net::SSLeays internal X509 format and can thus not be simply dumped and restored. The key for the hash is an \f(CW\*(C`ident\*(C'\fR either given to \f(CW\*(C`clone_cert\*(C'\fR or generated from the original certificate. .Sp If the argument is a subroutine it will be called as \f(CW\*(C`$cache\->(ident)\*(C'\fR to get an existing (cert,key) and with \f(CW\*(C`$cache\->(ident,cert,key)\*(C'\fR to cache the newly created certificate. .RE .RS 4 .RE .IP "\fB($clone_cert,$key) = \f(CB$mitm\fB\->clone_cert($original_cert,[ \f(CB$ident\fB ])\fR" 4 .IX Item "($clone_cert,$key) = $mitm->clone_cert($original_cert,[ $ident ])" This clones the given certificate. An ident as the key into the cache can be given (like \f(CW\*(C`host:port\*(C'\fR), if not it will be created from the properties of the original certificate. It returns the cloned certificate and its key (which is the same for alle created certificates). .IP "\fB\f(CB$string\fB = \f(CB$mitm\fB\->serialize\fR" 4 .IX Item "$string = $mitm->serialize" This creates a serialized version of the object (e.g. a string) which can then be used to persistantly store created certificates over restarts of the application. The cache will only be serialized if it is a \s-1HASH.\s0 To work together with Storable the \f(CW\*(C`STORABLE_freeze\*(C'\fR function is defined to call \f(CW\*(C`serialize\*(C'\fR. .IP "\fB\f(CB$mitm\fB = IO::Socket::SSL::Intercept\->unserialize($string)\fR" 4 .IX Item "$mitm = IO::Socket::SSL::Intercept->unserialize($string)" This restores an Intercept object from a serialized string. To work together with Storable the \f(CW\*(C`STORABLE_thaw\*(C'\fR function is defined to call \f(CW\*(C`unserialize\*(C'\fR. .SH "AUTHOR" .IX Header "AUTHOR" Steffen Ullrich